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PREFACE
This brochure represents an attempt to analyze and summarize the activities and
results of the first stage of the Small Projects program of Coalition 2000. Following
a competition held in the beginning of 1999, thirteen non-governmental organi-
zations, most of them based in different Bulgarian town and cities, were includ-
ed in the first pilot stage of the program. They include: ÔCivic Council in RazgradÕ
Citizens Coalition, ÔStefan StambolovÕ Bulgarian Youth League Ñ Smolian,
Center for the Study of Political Processes Ñ Shoumen, ÔLecturersÕ NGO Ñ
Plovdiv, ÔRevived Civil SocietyÕ Regional Association Ñ Pleven, InfoEcoClub Ñ
Vratza, Black Sea Legal Community Ñ Bourgas, ÔSexagintaÕ Open Education
Youth Center Ñ Rousse, as well as the Sofia-based Christian Revival Movement,
the Corruption-free Society Association, the Association of Young Lawyers, the
Foundation for Entrepreneurship Development, and the Bulgarian Association
for Fair Elections and Civil Rights. Within a time frame of three months (April Ñ
June 1999) they conducted activities covering the whole spectrum of the anti-
corruption campaign: participation in the Clean Future Public Awareness
Campaign, local government monitoring, establishment of anti-corruption struc-
tures, using different instruments to expose and curb corrupt practices in the
respective municipalities.
Despite the fact that such a short time frame does not enable the potential of the
Coalition 2000 local initiatives to be fully utilized, the experience accumulated
during that time can be used to map out future spheres, forms of organization,
and instruments in this new part of Bulgarian reality. This is why the brochure
focuses on the practices which seem most promising for our future work. It will
continue with the second stage of the Small Projects 1999-2000 program within
whose framework a permanent cooperation structure will be established with
local NGOs as part of the Coalition 2000 process.
In a structural respect the pamphlet consists of two main sections. The first con-
tains analyses of the pilot stage of local initiatives conducted by Coalition 2000
experts. The second section presents the so-called Òbest practicesÓ, as well as
some sociological studies conducted by our local partners. With the stipulation
that these are initiatives in their pilot, i.e. experimental, stage we recommend
them as already tested instruments which could effectively be used to accom-
plish the goals of anti-corruption activity.
A List of Activities under the Small Projects program of the 13 NGOs is append-
ed.

PART ONE
THE PROCESS COALITION 2000
AT THE LOCAL LEVEL

ZHIVKA DAMYANOVA,
Coalition 2000 xpert
LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND COALITION 2000:
LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND INTERACTION
Corruption at the local level: bribing policemen, doctors, tax officers, municipal
administrators for construction permits or a municipal market stall Ñ the kind of
corruption known as mass, everyday or low-level corruption Ñ is assessed by
experts to be much more widespread than corruption at high levels. Municipal
employees are widely regarded as the most corrupt civil servants, probably
because of their direct and personal contacts with citizens in providing the most
ordinary and most sought after public services. On the other hand, the admis-
sion that this kind of corruption helps people to survive, gradually causes soci-
ety to accept it as the norm.
Against this background, the Action Plan Against Corruption of Coalition 2000,
with its proposals for coalitions, constructive interaction and partnership
between local government and civic structures is very useful and topical.
Indisputably, the first positive effect is that the anti-corruption idea is descend-
ing from the high circles of the government and intellectual elite to reach peo-
ple in the country, i.e. the ordinary citizens.
Anti-corruption goals and initiatives at the local level were also discussed at the
International Conference held in Varna on 19 and 20 June this year on the sub-
ject of: Coalition Building and Monitoring to Counter Corruption: Strategies and
Impact in Central and Eastern Europe. It spotlighted similar features in the corrup-
tion situation in the post-communist countries and the extremely dangerous
consequences of wars in the Balkan region where the ambitions of organized
crime and illegal profiteers to dominate the local economy with the aid of cor-
rupt local officials are manifested. The participants in the conference rallied
round the idea of joint anti-corruption actions of local, national and interna-
tional organizations, of concrete initiatives addressing specific regional needs.
Openness and transparency in local government and active citizens participa-
tion through NGOs formed the basis of these initiatives.
We all realize that the thus clearly and succinctly defined goal Ñ Òstruggle
against corruptionÓ Ñ hides a large-scale task that is difficult to encompass and
measure. It is no accident that corruption is regarded as a global challenge on an
international level. In Bulgaria, as admitted even by the government, corruption
and crime are the main obstacles in the process of establishing democratic val-
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ues and European integration, and of creating a favorable environment for for-
eign investments and rapid economic development.
It is necessary to unfold all-out anti-corruption activities in which, besides the
authorized human rights and justice administering institutions, the coalition
model will discover its field of action and its specific mechanisms and forms of
influence aimed at changing public attitudes, creating intolerance of corruption,
building awareness of civil rights, and raising the image of local government Ñ
promoting confidence in the institutions and motivating proposals for improving
legislation.
The attainment of these goals in the short-term and long-term largely depends
on the interaction between local government and civic structures. In this
respect, considerable experience has been accumulated in Bulgaria in recent
years. The accomplishments of the pilot project of local anti-corruption initia-
tives within the framework of Coalition 2000 proved the viability of the coalition
model. Basic problems can also be outlined, such as cases of confrontation
which, no matter how different in the various municipalities and regions, share
a common source. One such factor of decisive significance for the environment
in which the anti-corruption coalition is developing and will continue to devel-
op, is the legal framework and actual position of the main partners Ñ local gov-
ernment and citizens associations.
The present paper attempts to point out those formulations in the legal frame-
work which directly or indirectly influence the behavior of local partners in anti-
corruption activity. A future in-depth and comprehensive study, taking account
of constantly developing practice, could also produce constructive proposals for
improving interaction and, ultimately, for improving the anti-corruption envi-
ronment at the local level.
Limiting and preventing corruption in local government, including elective
municipal bodies of the mayor and municipal council, as well as the municipal
administration, is an implicit part of the reform of local self-government and one
of the imperatives of the transition from totalitarian to civil society. Ever since the
start of the reform, however, municipalities and their problems have remained
on the fringe of the attention of legislators, except during election campaigns. As
soon as they were passed, the Local Self-Government and Local Administration
Act (LSGLAA, 1991), the Local Elections Act (LEA, 1995) and the Territorial
Administration of the Republic of Bulgaria Act (TARBA, 1995) were attacked for
a number of shortcomings, flaws and omissions. Amendments to these acts are
constantly being adopted, invariably aimed at improving the legal framework of
local self-government. In practice, however, the trend towards the destabiliza-
tion of local government is continuing. It is still too early to count the pluses and
minuses of the new administrative and regional development acts passed this
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year (1999). There are serious misgivings that, due to the lack of definite legal
and financial guarantees (in the first and second act respectively), local govern-
ment bodies remain in a critical position Ñ placed on an unequal footing and
dependent on the central government.
LetÕs take a closer look at the legal status of the municipal mayor. It is no secret
that the mayorÕs institution boasts the longest tradition in the 120-year-long his-
tory of Bulgaria. Besides the President of the Republic, mayors are elected under
the majority system, directly by the population. In accordance with the
Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria (Article 139) and the LSGLAA (Article
44), the mayor, as the body of executive power on the territory of the munici-
pality, is in charge of all executive activities, organizes the implementation of the
municipal budget and of the decisions of the Municipal Council, represents the
municipality before third persons, and manages and decides on municipal prop-
erty.
It is equally well-known that for the inhabitants of the municipality, town or vil-
lage, the mayor is the embodiment of power. The mayor is personally responsi-
ble to his fellow-citizens for his government and actions; he should be account-
able to them, whilst they should exercise control on him.
Regrettably, during the last couple of years we have witnessed an undermining
of the prestige of the mayorÕs institution. Reports of municipal mayors exceed-
ing their rights, abusing their powers, being handed over to the prosecutor or
court, or temporarily removed from office in contravention of the Constitution,
have become the order of the day. The most frequent charges are brought
against abuse of power and illegally derived benefits Ñ either personal or in
favor of close circles Ñ in the privatization of municipal companies, licensing of
businesses, assigning municipal contracts, and sale and leasing of municipal
property.
What is happening to the well-known prestige and democratism of the mayorÕs
institution? The answer to this question in all its aspects interests both political
parties and civic structures, as evidenced by the public debate on the political
elite and democratic values during the ongoing period of transition.
Here we are drawing attention to a situation which may well be considered
paradoxical for the mayorÕs institution in Bulgaria. Once elected and having
assumed office, the mayor discovers that the government of the municipality
depends completely on the central government. According to the statutory
framework, it is the central departments which determine the size, structure,
wages and management schemes of the respective municipal departments in
the main municipal activities: education, health care, social assistance, public
order and safety. In practice the municipality conducts activities without a real
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chance to control the management and expenditure of funds in relation to, for
example, schools, hospitals, the land commission, regional police department,
regional tax department, etc. These teams are subordinate to the state depart-
ments which, in turn, are not directly committed to the solution of concrete
regional and municipal problems. Although the municipality is responsible to
citizens with regard to typical municipal activities such as maintenance of the
water-supply and electricity network, the actual activity is carried out by state
structures.
Another source of tension is the regulation of relations between the mayor and
the Municipal Council, i.e. between local executive and legislative power. In
accordance with the legal framework (Constitution, Article 138; LSGLAA Article
18 and 21), the Municipal Council is the supreme body of local self-government.
Article 21, Paragraph 1 specifically defines 22 groups of powers, the list not being
exhaustive because Paragraph 2 also lists Òother tasks of local importance which
are not of the exclusive competence of other bodiesÓ. The mayor, besides coor-
dinating his activities with the central departments, is also obliged to implement
the decisions of the Municipal Council.
The operative management of the municipality, and concrete decisions on a
number of questions concerning the management of municipal property, infra-
structure, etc., are often hampered by the slow and inefficient mechanisms of
the municipal councils Ñ either due to lack of the necessary quorum in the
permanent commissions, the practice of transferring correspondence for con-
sideration from one commission to another, or delayed meetings of the
Municipal Council.
The work of some municipal councils is simply blocked by the political con-
frontation among the groups of municipal councilors. The most negative conse-
quences result from the practice of voting according to party principle Ñ even
on matters such as water supply or kindergarten repairs. In answering the ques-
tion of why a drastic reduction of hospital funds was approved, one UtDF
municipal councilor said: ÒThey [the BSP majority] are raising their hands like
obedient schoolboys.Ó In another case when the UtDF majority voted en bloc,
the result was that the Roma municipal councilors actually voted against a sew-
erage project for a Roma neighborhood.
Differences and contradictions between the mayor and the Municipal Council
emerge not only on the basis of political confrontation, but also due to the inad-
equate distribution of rights and responsibilities between the two institutions.
Among the municipal councilors, vested with supreme powers and elected on a
party list, personal responsibility is blurred. In practice, many municipal coun-
cilors regard themselves as responsible mainly to their party, whereas the mayor
carries personal responsibility for his actions before the population.
12 Local Anti-Corruption Initiatives
Finally, we should also mention the role of the regional administrations, estab-
lished recently and still at the experimental stage, so to speak. In Bulgaria, in
contrast to most European countries, these are purely administrative, appointed
rather than elected bodies, without the right to their own funds for the devel-
opment and conduct of social activities. To make up for this, regional governors
are assigned certain rights in exercising control over the activities of local self-
government bodies. This fact, in contravention of Article 144 of the Constitution,
has already given rise to objections by experts and creates conditions for new
conflicts between local government and the ÒCenterÓ, personified by the region-
al governor.
This is the picture, albeit schematically presented, of the links and dependencies
of local government by virtue of which local self-government is realized. It is
only natural that a large group of problems should manifest itself in the course
of the implementation of the pilot program of local anti-corruption coalitions.
These problems include the lack of transparency in municipal incomes and
expenses, shifting and blurring responsibilities or escaping behind collective
responsibility, (in practice irresponsibility), and a lack of efficient citizens con-
trol. The attempt of the NGOs to launch a public debate on municipal finances
and possible abuses met with a number of obstacles, both in municipalities
where the budget is guarded almost like a Òstate secretÓ, as well as in munici-
palities where the budget is displayed in a prominent place for all to see, but
only a few citizens ever stop to read it.
The situation of local incomes and expenses is such that they are voted on as a
matter of form by the municipal councils, but limits and priorities are regulated
in the national budget and in the ordinances of the respective ministries. The
population pays taxes without even knowing where the money goes. Local
incomes cannot affect a change in local policy because this is not within the
competence of the municipal administration. Viewed formally, the municipali-
ty is a cash register through which money passes for financing a centrally regu-
lated health, educational and social policy.
The financing of municipalities continues according to an ultra-centralized
model. The new Corporate Income Tax Act (1997), the Personal Income Tax
Act, and the Local Taxes and Fees Act failed to produce even a simple quantity
increase of local incomes. If local incomes formed 21-22% of the general
municipal incomes in 1994-1996, in 1998 they comprised about 17% of the
local budgets, whilst the greatest part Ñ over 80% Ñ came from state transfers
(according to information of the Ministry of Finance). The most significant source
of income Ñ General Income Tax Ñ remains at the disposal of the central gov-
ernment. The situation is exactly opposite in countries with developed local self-
government where income tax is a purely local tax. This makes for stable and
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independent local finances and helps to solve specific local problems with local
resources.
Conversely, in Bulgaria, as admitted by one of the founders of the tax adminis-
tration, Òmayors are not elected on the basis of the tax and finance policy they
offer for accomplishing the set goals, but mainly on a party principle, and it is
only natural that the one who is closer to the executive has a greater chance of
successÓ (1).
Another factor detrimental to the stability of municipalities is the manner in
which state target subsidies are determined. In the present difficult economic sit-
uation of the country and the impoverishment of the population, only a few
municipalities are able to rely solely on their own incomes. In the view of
experts, however, subsidies are not clearly defined and subjective decisions are
possible. (2) Despite the existence of formal criteria (from five in 1993 their num-
ber has now grown to 21), in practice the mechanism for the formation and dis-
tribution of subsidies is extremely complicated and nontransparent. There are
no guarantees of just distribution to motivate municipalities to effectively utilize
funds. The statement of an MP on the question of subsidies, i.e. that the mayor
must know ÒhowÓ to ask for money, speaks for itself. The ÒabnormalÓ practice
of mayors spending much of their time in Sofia in search of funds and knocking
on the doors of ministries (or ministers, depending on their personal connec-
tions) is regarded as normal.
The failure to pay the wages of doctors and teachers in municipal institutions has
come to be regarded as normal. It is only natural that the protests of doctors in
Shoumen, Kazanluk and Stara Zagora are addressed to the municipality and
mayor. But it is not always known who is responsible for this gross violation of
their civil rights, guaranteed by the Constitution and the Labor Code. Whereas
the Municipal Budgets Act envisages sanctions for municipalities failing to meet
their prescribed obligations, including the payment of wages, there are no legal-
ly regulated sanctions against the ministry in case of failure to regularly transfer
the full amount of state subsidies to the municipalities. In the pyramid of state
institutions, municipalities are placed in an unequal position.
The centralized management of incomes and expenses is still the greatest prob-
lem of the municipality and its executive body, the mayor. Conditions exist for
shifting responsibility from the local to the central government. Instead of being
dependent on his electors, the mayor turns out to be dependent on ministers
and the cabinet. Instead of trying to find a solution to local problems in the local
community, the municipal administration does so in the ÒCenterÓ which pro-
vides all the ÒgoodsÓ. This is a serious distortion which questions the existence
of genuine local self-government.
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The ÒcrippledÓ interaction between the municipality and the bodies of public
order and safety are a typical example. The mayor is in the center of public con-
cerns with regard to crime and the corruption linked with it. This function is laid
down in Article 44 of the LSGLAA which even provides for the possibility of the
mayor issuing compulsory orders to the chiefs of police departments. This pos-
sibility remains purely theoretical though, since it is neither endorsed with ade-
quate powers, nor guaranteed by the LSGLAA, the National Police Act, or ordi-
nances of the Interior Ministry.
As a result of the obvious discrepancy between responsibilities and powers, the
struggle against crime, which in reality is increasing in both big and small munic-
ipalities, cannot be efficient. It is a little known fact that most mayors do not
regard the maintenance of public order and safety as a very serious priority
problem for the municipality. (3)
Crime Ñ the greatest evil in the state Ñ is considered a problem of the central
government and its structures.
A further conclusion is that not only with regard to crime, but also in coping with
their economic and social problems, such as unemployment, health care and
maintenance of the infrastructure, the municipalities are forced to rely to a large
extent on the central government. It is no accident that precisely health care,
education, social welfare and investments in the municipalities are now
declared Ògray zonesÓ where corruption pressure is greatest. In these spheres
management and financing are determined by the central departments, whilst
the moral responsibility is left to the municipal administrations. It is clear that the
discrepancy, duplication and inadequate distribution of rights and responsibili-
ties between central and local level create conditions for arbitrariness, abuse of
power and corruption.
The studies revealed a need for a decisive reform of local self-government in
which the tax services should shift to the operative management of the munici-
pal administration, whilst municipalities are given the power to determine and
collect local taxes, and are given greater independence at the local level in
regard to education, healthcare, the land commissions, and crime. When may-
ors ask for greater autonomy of the municipalities, this is not a matter of wanti-
ng greater rights, but of seeking adequacy between the constitutional powers
and responsibilities to the population, on the one hand, and financial and
administrative possibilities for their realization, on the other.
The shortcomings in the current legal framework, and the lack of economic,
structural and administrative guarantees for realizing municipal activities and
programs, create conditions for abuse and violations. ThatÕs when local govern-
ment shifts to Òmanual operationÓ and enters the thicket of the Ògray sectorÓ.
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Legality is replaced by the principle of Òeverybody save himself as best he canÓ.
The undermined prestige of the mayorÕs institution and the lowered image of
the mayor in many places is also largely due to this.
In this situation it is understandable why participants in the anti-corruption dis-
cussions voiced skepticism and distrust of the effectiveness of cooperation with
the municipal authorities. WhatÕs the point of discussing draft budgets with the
citizenry if the budget parameters are defined by the Ministry of Finance; whatÕs
the point of discussing regional development programs without any clear crite-
ria of target subsidies? These are all key questions which need to be solved by
legislation in order to effect a change in local self-government, and hence also
in relations between local government and the public sector.
Only then will Bulgaria be able to come close to the principles of the European
Local Self-Government Charter (Article 9) according to which local governments
are entitled to sufficient funds of their own to freely dispose of in exercising their
constitutional competencies.
The reform regarding decentralization of power as a preventive measure in the
struggle against corruption in the state and municipal administration is also real-
ized by the representatives of NGOs, especially those who are working in the
sphere of municipal activities, for municipal and regional development.
Such a reform can be achieved Ñ as required by the Constitution Ñ solely with
the consensus of the political forces in the National Assembly. In this respect the
mission of NGOs or the so-called third sector, including local anti-corruption
coalitions, is to take part by means of specific impact mechanisms in the mobi-
lization of civil society in favor of the reform, to lobby among genuine reformist
MPs, regardless of their political affiliation, and to interact with genuine
reformist municipal councilors, willing to assume self-government, rather than to
be governed.
Conditions are also ripe for the adoption of an Non-governmental and Non-
profit Organizations Act. In fact, the legislatorsÕ work can be facilitated Ñ the
rapid growth of the third sector in Bulgaria provides enough material for legisla-
tive initiative. Statistics show that some 7,500 such organizations are currently
registered under the Persons and Family Act. Only 1,000-1,500 of these are truly
operating, however, funded mainly by foreign sponsors and institutions. About
one percent of the financing comes from the state. Within the framework of the
Strategy for BulgariaÕs Accession to the European Union the government has also
stated its willingness to Òassert the role of NGOs as a corrective and partner of
the state and municipal administration through their inclusion in policy forma-
tion and implementation and by providing services in all spheres of public lifeÓ.
The adoption of such an act will regulate relations between the state and public
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sector, and contribute to greater stability and confidence among their institu-
tions.
The active assistance of the non-governmental sector in the discussion and
preparation of other legislative decisions as well Ñ such as the access to infor-
mation, and the creation of a new democratic institution for the control of state
and local government and the protection of civil rights (ombudsman or peopleÕs
advocate) Ñ is an activity of principal importance for improving the environ-
ment of interaction and coalitions, including at the local level.
At the same time, the limited powers of local government turn the development
of the third sector into a public reserve of local self-government. The interaction
with NGOs enables some of the restrictions to be compensated for and addi-
tional possibilities to be created for assisting in the solution of economic, social,
ecological and other problems of the municipalities and regions. This applies
fully to anti-corruption coalitions.
What has been carried out so far within the Transparency of Local Government
campaign reveals a realistic orientation to identifying the level of interaction with
the different bodies of local self-government Ñ the mayor and municipal coun-
cilors. The existing political will for struggling against corruption is a good basis
for the broader inclusion of municipal councilors in anti-corruption coalitions
and the use of their powers for legislative initiatives, for the participation of
NGOs in Municipal Council meetings with a deliberative vote, and for signing
memorandums for interaction. The adoption of a Program for Struggle against
Corruption by the municipal councils in Pleven and Lyazkovets is a good exam-
ple of this.
Interaction is also needed with such a significant structure as the permanent
commissions of the Municipal Council which, in accordance with Chapter Six of
the LSGLAA, have every right to serve as the transmitters of civic initiatives in the
Municipal Council and to exercise control over the execution of its decisions.
Representatives of NGOs could be involved as experts and consultants in con-
nection with signals of violations and abuse. The permanent commissions could
also help to establish feedback with the ongoing local corruption monitoring;
i.e., to monitor the reaction of the municipality to revealed corruption practices.
The optimization of the control function of the permanent commissions in
spheres where corruption pressure is strong Ñ issuing licenses and permits, leas-
ing municipal property, assigning municipal contracts, supplying municipal
establishments with fuel and food, construction, tenders, etc. Ñ would be a
welcome positive practical result of anti-corruption efforts.
The new Information Services Centers set up with the municipalities are a nat-
ural ally of the anti-corruption coalition. They are also a place for meetings and
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contacts with local journalists Ñ something which was cited as an important
condition for anti-corruption activity. These Centers came into being thanks to
the joint efforts of the municipality and the non-governmental sector Ñ above
all the Foundation for Local Government Reform, with the financial and tech-
nological support of foreign sponsoring organizations. An interesting initiative for
turning municipalities into an Òeffective and friendly supplier of information and
servicesÓ is currently underway in Blagoevgrad, Dobrich, Gabrovo, Haskovo and
Stara Zagora. It will be interesting to see whether this new acquisition has made
the municipality more transparent. Has corruption pressure diminished, has
there been a change in corruption factors? The general poverty of the munici-
palities justifies the purposeful joint use of funds from the municipal and non-
governmental sector for publishing public awareness materials such as a Manual
of Public Services and accounts of municipal finances, as well as the organiza-
tion of Òopen reception roomsÓ or consultations for citizens.
It may be said that the intensification and mobilization of the existing levels and
teams in local government are an important reserve for local anti-corruption
coalitions and, above all, in the work for improving the image of local govern-
ment, for greater transparency, and greater citizens participation and civic con-
trol.
In this respect, the question of the openness and transparency of appointments
in the municipal administration emerges as one of the most difficult problems,
observed by almost all local partners. It is clear that the choice and appointment
of municipal employees is complex and responsible. The status of the municipal
employee is regulated in the Local Self-Government and Local Administration
Act Ñ the principle of competition is introduced, job descriptions are prepared.
Even so, many aspects remain unregulated by the legal framework. Has the
motivation of the municipal employee Ñ ruled by the striving for personal gains
in the recent practice of the totalitarian state Ñ changed in one decade? How
does the modern idea of the social function and the role of employee profes-
sionalism combine with the still existing idea of Òstable position in exchange for
personal loyaltyÓ? Is the frequently discussed principle of teamwork being ade-
quately applied?
The monitoring conducted so far shows that this part of the work of the munic-
ipality is often guarded like a taboo. The traditional Bulgarian paternalistic idea
of the nature of public power probably also plays a role in this. In reality, the
authorities themselves are interested in changing and establishing public and
objective criteria of appointments because, above all, the performance of
municipal activities and population services depends greatly on good employ-
ees. Besides this, appointments along the lines of friendship, family ties and
party affiliation, already strongly opposed by the public, are the first symptoms
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discrediting a new government. The nepotistic services of civil servants are one
of the poorly concealed practices of corruption.
Thus, a basis exists in this sphere, too, for joint efforts by municipal and civic
structures. The European countries and the USA have gained considerable expe-
rience in the introduction of mechanisms for the prevention of conflicts based
on personal or group interests, for avoiding the intertwining of official and per-
sonal interests, for guaranteeing the transparency of incomes and supervision of
the established rules. The legislation of the European Union also contains stan-
dards of professional ethics.
The anti-corruption environment in the municipality will also be improved by
creating better organization in the work of the administration, better conditions
and computerization. The fact that the issuing and completion of standard doc-
uments takes place in a large common room, aimed at preventing improper
contacts between citizens and employees, should help to minimize personal
interference in the drawing up of documents, restrict the arbitrariness of civil ser-
vants and ease corruption pressure on citizens.
The resources of the anti-corruption coalition are expanding outside the frame-
work of the municipal government and administration thanks to the initiated
decentralization in some spheres in which municipal functions and rights have
been delegated to civil structures. We are referring to the committees for tripar-
tite cooperation which have direct knowledge of corruption pressure on the
extremely sore problem of unemployment and the conditions for appointments.
The reading clubs which have now gained legal independence are another local
community center manifesting definite willingness for anti-corruption activity.
The Youth Centers, together with the schools where, as the experience in
Rousse shows, new ideas are born, are particularly conducive to joint initiatives.
The broad representativeness and the participation of a greater number of
NGOs is also a guarantee of the greater effectiveness of anti-corruption coali-
tions. Opportunities are opening up for joint initiatives with regional organiza-
tions and associations of municipalities, as well as with the Foundation for Local
Government Reform and the National Association of Municipalities in the
Republic of Bulgaria. Thus, the work of coalitions both on a local and national
level will aid the reforms for better local self-government, help to create a suit-
able legal environment for the non-governmental sector as a corrective of
power, and establish new models of interaction and (why not?) the model of a
ÒCorruption-free MunicipalityÓ.
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THE LOCAL ANTI-CORRUPTION COALITIONS:
PILOT PHASE IN THE BUILDING OF A
COALITION 2000 NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE
The local anti-corruption initiatives, formulated and put into practice by
Coalition 2000 in numerous municipalities, represent an indispensable addition
to the nationwide Clean Future Awareness Campaign. The inquiries completed
in a number of Bulgarian towns as a part of the Coalition 2000 Small Projects pro-
gram unequivocally revealed that corruption within local authority structures is
a fact.
On the other hand, counteracting corruption in local government and public
services at the municipal level is focused on because in this area the efforts for
achieving greater transparency and publicity have greater chances for success,
and measuring their effectiveness is relatively easy.
The general conclusions made with respect to the local authorities could also be
applied to the central administration. There too, corruption and the inclination
to corrupt practices exist in association with the other vices, haunting the admin-
istration and the citizen-public authority relationship at the municipal level. The
majority of these vices are deeply rooted and bear the mark of half a century of
socialism with its totally formalized public organizations and initiatives, and with
people alienated from political power as a result of the hyper-centralization.
It is not accidental that, as one representative of the local authorities in Plovdiv
concluded, municipal administration has not altered over the last fifty years.
That is, bureaucracy, ineffectiveness, insufficient information, lack of respon-
siveness to the demands for quality public services, etc., are the chronic diseases
of local government that create preconditions for the emergence of corrupt
practices. Also, it is widely believed that corruption appears as a consequence
of the scanty remuneration of public servants, forcing them to seek other finan-
cial sources in order to be able to support their families.
Thus, the Coalition 2000 experts are aware of the fact that if the anti-corruption
measures are not supplemented by other activities and initiatives designed to
promote local government and civil control, they would resemble a treatment
dealing with the symptoms of the disease, instead of its causes. This, however,
does not mean that corruption-related problems should be dismissed as a typi-
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cal phenomenon of the transition period. The Coalition 2000 local initiatives
facilitate the identification of those aspects of the reform which directly affect
the diffusion of corrupt practices.
On the basis of the first three-month phase of the implementation of local anti-
corruption projects, some initial conclusions could be made describing the cur-
rent possibilities and the future perspectives for cooperation with local authori-
ties, as well as the preconditions allowing the reproduction of mass and bureau-
cratic corrupt practices.
One of the major factors generating corruption is the lack of transparency and
accountability in the public services sphere. In a situation of non-transparency and
procedural vagueness in the institutions, the citizens could easily be misled and
forced to pay for services which are free of charge, and could be humiliated by
unconscientious public servants.
The issue of information availability about public services is two-sided. On the
one hand, the problem is overcoming the inertia of bureaucracy or its conscious
interest in monopolizing information. Of course, not all of these cases imply
deliberate inclination to corruption. An unqualified public servant could conceal
his incompetence by pointing to the lack of procedural guidelines and unspeci-
fied applicability of the services. The consequence of such a motivation is evi-
dent: the combination of incompetence and self-interest damages the citizensÕ
interest, while the cases of corruption pressure bring financial losses, in addition
to humiliation and disappointment from the work of local institutions.
Thus, the major goal of the local anti-corruption initiatives, based on the inter-
action of representatives of the local authorities with civil society, is to promote
the transparency of public services and to create preconditions for civil control of the
governmental institutions. Basically, the very nature of the problem implies a self-
critical attitude on the part of the directors of local public institutions, and seg-
regation of interests in order to Òopen upÓ the respective municipality. As a
result of the implementation of the local anti-corruption initiatives, different
forms of interaction could appear, varying from productive cooperation and
compatibility to confrontation and obstructionism. The practice of the 13 non-
governmental organizations participating in the pilot projects during the period
April-June 1999, delineates this spectrum of forms of interaction between the
public and the private sector in the municipalities under consideration.
NGOs and the local administration: forms of interaction
There were three basic types of interaction between the organizations of civil
society and local governmental structures.
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The first kind of interaction could be defined as the coalition type. It is charac-
terized not only by the stated enthusiasm of high-ranking representatives of the
local authorities, but also by their actual participation in the various initiatives of
the pilot projects. The anti-corruption coalition created in Smolian exemplifies
this type. Here, there were good personal connections between the leader of
the non-governmental organization implementing this project and the local
administrative political elites. In this case then, institutional cooperation is pre-
conditioned by the existence of friendly relations between the leaders of insti-
tutions belonging respectively to the public and the private sector. (Although this
interaction seems unproblematic, this may be due to the short time frame of the
pilot project and its effectivity still needs to be proved).
The coalition type of interaction has some advantages. Most importantly, the
personal commitment on the part of the heads of key municipal and central
institutions ensures an Òinstitutional umbrellaÓ for potential cooperation with the
lower system levels (for instance, for the purpose of acquiring administrative
information). Generally, the commitment of local government executives to the
anti-corruption campaign facilitates its legitimization and public institutionaliza-
tion.
In the case of cooperation among institutions of the public and the private sec-
tor, the subject of an anti-corruption critique might be a representative of the
medium or lower ranks of the municipal/central administration. In other words,
the active collaboration of the local political elite implies the absence of corrupt
practices among the top ranks of local government. By default, corruption in
analogous situations is Òbureaucratic corruptionÓ; i.e., it emanates from the
abuse of the right to administrative discretion, but not through the possession of
political power or the channels of party clientelism.
The disadvantages of institutional cooperation follow from the assumption that
political corruption is non-existing. Or, corruption becomes a very delicate
issue, since it directly affects the interest and position of local government lead-
ers involved with the anti-corruption initiative. In other words, cooperation of
this type can only be effective if the highest political and administrative ranks of
local government are not involved in corrupt deals and practices. In this theo-
retically ideal case, the coalition principle would imply multiplication of the
efforts for curbing mass/bureaucratic corruption by combining the instruments
of the local state/municipal apparatus with those of the non-governmental sec-
tor, business circles, and local media.
However, it is highly probable that institutional cooperation in the context of the
anti-corruption campaign will be accompanied by instances of corrupt practices
on the part of some high-ranking officials, and in particular with cases of abus-
ing the power attached to the position of appointing particular people, or in the
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process of decision-making in the corresponding institution. In such cases the
cooperation would represent only a verbally stated commitment on the part of
the leaders of local government, while, in actuality, their behavior would be of
what can be called the imitation type.
In those instances when local government leaders try to identify with the anti-
corruption goals and ethics through mimicry in the public space, publicity is the
most effective tool for pressuring them to prove their stated commitment.
Politicians and senior administrators should be held accountable; their stated
commitment to the campaign should be utilized and transformed into a tool for
influencing the lower echelons of the local administration.
A touchstone for the validity of the commitment of high-ranking local govern-
ment officials to the campaign goals is the extent to which the representatives of
the middle administrative stratum (department heads, chief accountants, per-
sonal secretaries, etc.) will alter their practices. A situation in which the execu-
tives issue a permission (for instance, for access to information) which is dis-
missed by the lower-standing administrators raises suspicion of passive resis-
tance to the anti-corruption activities. In other words, there is evidence for
behind-the-scenes counteraction to the publicly encouraged efforts of the non-
governmental organization (respectively, the local anti-corruption structure).
The predominant situation, however, suggests a local configuration of a some-
what different type. The prevailing attitude in the majority of the studied munic-
ipalities is that some local institutionsÕ officials are involved in abusing political
influence and/or administrative power. At the same time, some executives enjoy
a good public reputation and for this reason they could be included in the anti-
corruption initiative. In isolated cases, there is institutional cooperation by sec-
tors, as a result of the executive status of the officials in question. For instance,
in a given town the mayor is corrupt, but the chief of police is honest and coop-
erates with the local non-governmental organization. Here is a case of creating
an activist lobby structure within the system of local government, which could
even involve entire institutions, and which signals the existence of Òinterest dif-
ferencesÓ among the representatives of the executive political and administra-
tive elites. Thus, the very commitment to and public identification with the fight
against corruption will exacerbate the already existing differences, this time,
however, reinforced by the diverging responses to the anti-corruption initiative.
The power arrangement in the case of institutional cooperation by sectors in the
anti-corruption campaign implies a continuous Òpositional warÓ between the
local anti-corruption coalition and the local officials who passively oppose it.
The anti-corruption structures in Vratsa, Razgrad, and Shoumen have been con-
fronted with such lack of cooperation.
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In the most adverse case which we can describe as a confrontational type of
interaction the local authorities/institutions become hostile to the non-govern-
mental organization and its initiative, refusing any kind of interaction with it, and
even attempt to threaten it or to apply administrative pressure. This course of
action goes through several stages Ñ disregard, irony, and open hostility.
In the case of a confrontational type of interaction between the anti-corruption
coalition and the local authorities, the nature of the anti-corruption lobby with-
in the power system alters. There are activists who support the anti-corruption
campaign and, thus, assume a critical or an openly negative stance toward the
local government executives. Such lobbyists could be categorized as Òopposition
lobbyistsÓ, without necessarily being members of the political party opposing
those in power. The table below summarizes the basic forms of interaction
between the local authorities and the non-governmental sector:
Explanatory notes to the table
Ð An activist lobby structure/representatives of the administration consists of
people who cooperate honestly with the anti-corruption structure and are
ready to enter into conflict with the high ranks of the administration
Ð An institutional lobby structure includes decision-makers from the local gov-
ernment, thus ensuring the cooperation of the entire institution
Ð A Ótarget of the anti-corruption campaignÓ signifies the specific stratum of the
bureaucracy on which the local anti-corruption coalition exerts pressure
The Clean Future Campaign From the Viewpoint
of Political Parties
The implementation of the Clean Future Awareness Campaign highlighted the
issue of compatibility between the anti-corruption objectives and specific polit-
ical party interests. Instances of compatibility as well as deviation exist in rela-
tion to the already discussed models of institutional interaction.
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Local government Target of the Lobby structure Description of the
Situation type response anti-corruption type municipality
campaign
Coalition Cooperation Middle-level ranks Institutional Transparent/open
of the bureaucracy
Imitation Passive resistance High-ranking Activist Transition type
bureaucracy
Confrontation Active resistance High-ranking Opposition Enclosed
bureaucracy
Compatibility follows from the circumstance that the district, municipal, and
central institutionsÕ directorates have a particular political bent. In other words,
in the cases of coalition-type cooperation with the high-ranking administrative
elite, it could be expected that the non-governmental organization/anti-corrup-
tion coalition will not be opposed by the local management of the locally pre-
dominant political party. However, the situation becomes more complicated if
the UDF/UtDF, the major political party on a national scale, is the opposition
power in the particular municipality. As often occurred in the course of the
Small Projects program, in the cases of open or passive resistance by the BSP
local government representatives, some non-governmental organizations were
favored and even publicly supported by the central state authorities, as well as
by the district governor. This is a situation of the ÒsandwichÓ type, which could
bring short-term dividends to the anti-corruption organization, but at the same
time it bears the disadvantages of possible politicization and public identification
with party objectives. In actuality, however, an active commitment on the part
of political officials nationwide should be expected exactly in this situation.
The emergence of still another situation is possible, in which the anti-corruption
coalition enters into conflict with the corrupt local UDF management and is
objectively supported by representatives of the opposition political forces (BSP,
etc.), although such instances were lacking during the first stage of the campaign.
This pattern would be the most disadvantageous to the non-governmental orga-
nization, due to the drawbacks of being publicly identified with the left opposi-
tion in a predominantly ÒblueÓ municipality.
To summarize, the goals of the anti-corruption initiative could be promoted by
political dynamics and mechanisms, especially when the rising political power
intensively utilizes anti-corruption slogans and messages in its election cam-
paign, attempting to build for itself the image of an alternative to the antecedent
corrupt government. So was the case with the UDF/UtDF which assumed power
in 1997, taking advantage of the wave of public discontent from the combina-
tion of incompetence and corruption among the ruling BSP representatives. The
commitment of the new government to the fight against organized crime and
corruption created the specific conditions for the promotion of the Coalition
2000 initiative. 
This commitment is especially important for the local anti-corruption initiatives,
since it diminishes the risk of confrontation in those municipalities where the
local authorities belong to the governing political party. 
At the same time, against the backdrop of the election campaigns (Bulgaria is
now just in the beginning of the campaigns for local government elections which
are to take place in the autumn of 1999) the common focus of the efforts of the
reformist party/coalition, on the one hand, and of the local anti-corruption struc-
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ture, on the other, may deprive the latter of its individuality and lead to its sub-
ordination to narrow party interests. The reverse case is possible too, if the rul-
ing UDF perceives the initiatives of Coalition 2000 as undermining its pre-elec-
tion efforts to represent the situation in the country, including the fight against
corruption, as more optimistic. Paying attention to the complexity of politics,
Coalition 2000 designs its initiatives so that they will not be politically suspicious.
Thus, the two peaks of the anti-corruption campaign were scheduled respec-
tively for the periods May-June and October-November, i.e. preceding and fol-
lowing the election campaign.
The principle of autonomy of civil initiative/organization represents an impor-
tant aspect of the collaboration with local and national structures of the political
parties. This principle places the interests of civil society outside the political
plane, and thus it should be of priority significance when considering the bene-
fits/disadvantages of entering into coalitions with political entities. According to
Pasquale Ferraro, Deputy Director of IDLI (Rome), it is necessary that there be
Òcreative tensionÓ in the relations between the local authorities and the non-
governmental sector. This means that cooperation should promote transparen-
cy and civil control, instead of concealing scandalous disclosures, or removing
the attention of the general public from the areas of corruption in public admin-
istration.
These arguments may look like wishful thinking against the background of the
hyper-politicization of public life locally, as well as at the national level. Political
intolerance thwarts the promotion of civil interests and inadvertently negatively
affects the municipal anti-corruption campaign. The validity of this dynamic is
not limited to Bulgarian public life. David PutnamÕs representative study of
North and South Italy reveals that in the areas where political intolerance is most
pronounced, civil society is weakest, and corruption is most ubiquitous. In the
context of the Coalition 2000 initiatives, hyper-politicization and the lack of pro-
ductive dialogue among the local party entities marginalize the fight against cor-
ruption as a social initiative, or lead to attempts to subsume it under the mech-
anisms of local confrontation. Conversely, political tolerance and the promotion
of the autonomy of civil institutions imply a removal of the Òparty umbrellaÓ pro-
tecting corrupt public officials, and requires the establishment of objective crite-
ria for the evaluation of their work. In such municipalities the distinction would
not be between Òour peopleÓ and Òtheir peopleÓ, but between qualified and
reliable administrators, on the one hand, and corrupt and incompetent bureau-
crats, on the other.
The Local Anti-Corruption Coalitions… 27
Cooperation with the Private Sector
It is only natural that non-governmental organizations in a municipality create a
model for coalition cooperation, based on the common interests of civil society
in the area of fighting corruption. In practice, this happened as soon as the pro-
jects were launched. Thus, for example, one of our local partners was the ÔCivic
Council in RazgradÕ Citizens Coalition which incorporates a number of NGOs.
Coalition cooperation at the stage of project implementation was also realized
in Plovdiv where the partner of Coalition 2000 Ñ ÔLecturersÕ NGO Ñ interacted
closely with the Lawyers for Civil Rights Association, the MENSA-Plovdiv
Association, and the ÔMedia with a Human FaceÕ Association, among others.
Cooperation along the Òhorizontal axisÓ was realized in Vratsa, Shoumen,
Pleven and elsewhere.
In continuing to implement the local initiatives of Coalition 2000, it would be a
good thing to encourage NGOs to form coalitions in implementing the projects
and even to apply with jointly developed projects. Of course, this approach
should not result in obscuring competencies or a lack of coordination. This dan-
ger could arise if the distribution of tasks and responsibilities is not clearly
defined.
Serious efforts should be made to involve representatives of the local business
elite in future anti-corruption coalitions. With the exception of the Foundation
for Entrepreneurship Development, none of our partners are able to boast any
major involvement of businessmen in their anti-corruption initiatives during the
first stage. Clearly, we need to develop those aspects of transparency and open-
ness in local government which would correspond most to the interests of the
local business community in a given municipality.
Forthcoming Tasks and Priorities
Both the positive and negative results of the pilot stage of the local initiatives of
Coalition 2000 need to be analyzed in order to properly channel the efforts of our
future partners, as well as of the coalition as a whole. The best way to ensure an
optimal launchpad for the programÕs second stage is perhaps the better specifica-
tion of the mission of anti-corruption organizations. It would not be logical to expect
the public to show confidence in organizations which themselves are unclear
about the parameters of their activity and the genuinely accomplishable set
goals. The confusion in the public image of anti-corruption structures should
also be considered in this respect.
The legitimization of NGOs though anti-corruption projects faces further diffi-
culties linked, on the one hand, with the scale of the goal that is difficult to mea-
sure and, on the other, with the largely negative nature of these efforts, aimed
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at destroying a permanently established, albeit depraved, status quo in munici-
palities.
This shows yet again that, in future, Coalition 2000 should encourage a balance
between critical/destructive tasks (of the Òstruggle againstÓ type) and construc-
tive tasks in the efforts for greater transparency and openness of local govern-
ment.
The accomplishment of this task will be aided by the clear identification of the
whole cycle of activities which will be realized as part of the local initiatives of
Coalition 2000, i.e.:
¥ Corruption monitoring
¥ Prevention (by means of legal consultations for citizens exposed to corrup-
tion)
¥ Legal assistance for the victims of corruption
¥ Signals and interaction with competent bodies
¥ Control of signals and the activity of justice Ñ administering bodies in cases
of corruption
¥ Cooperation with local government for transparency of public services
¥ Concrete proposals for reforms and solutions of existing corruption-related
problems.
It is no accident that these priorities, recommended by Coalition 2000, are in the
same vein and at times also identical with those of the public reform. In this
sense, the optimal positioning of local anti-corruption initiatives presupposes the
publicly stated partiality of the respective NGOs to the philosophy and goals of
the administrative reform and the strengthening of local self-government in the
spirit of modern standards and practices.
In this sense, the local anti-corruption coalitions are objective allies of the
reformist forces which are trying to create a modern municipal administration.
Transparency and citizen control within the municipality would be guaranteed
to an even larger extent if it were under conditions of genuine decentralization,
the reduction of the levels of local self-government by bringing administrative
services closer to the population, and the processes of rationalizing the activity
of the local authorities. It is clear that downsizing the bureaucratic apparatus and
shifting some public functions to non-governmental and private business organi-
zations conform to present-day trends for improved public services. In addition,
this should also help to diminish bureaucratic corruption.
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The experience gained so far within the Small Projects program evidences the
need of introducing the following elements:
¥ Developing clear criteria for appointments in local government institutions,
including computer skills.
¥ Introducing clear and publicly announced rules of procedure for providing
available public services.
¥ Endorsing a publicly announced system of sanctioning public servants and
giving up the practice of blurring responsibility.
¥ Giving up the practice of willfully defining areas of Òadministrative secretÓ.
¥ Continued implementation of the reform of local self-government in confor-
mity with modern models of municipal administration and public services.
Last, but not least, there is the problem of the development of civil society and
enhancing citizens knowledge within the framework of the municipality. This
will be one of the accompanying results of the successful implementation of
anti-corruption initiatives at the local level. At the same time, the success of the
efforts for transparency and openness is determined by adequate public activity
and realized interest. It is no secret that part of the problems of transparency of
local government are related to the lack of initiative and the need of citizens to
be informed. There is the peculiar phenomenon of Òpassive transparencyÓ; i.e.,
information is available and can be used by any interested citizen, but interest is
either lacking or not active. One example is provided by Razgrad Municipality.
The report of our partner organization ÔCivic Council in RazgradÕ Citizens
Coalition shows that the municipal administration uses a number of forms of
transparency in its activity. Thus, for example, the mayor gives press conferences
for the local media once a month, the local ÔGledishtaÕ paper publishes the
mayorÕs weekly schedule, Radio Oberon airs the weekly schedule of the mayor
and municipal administration, the acts of the mayor and municipal council are
posted on a news board on the ground floor of the municipal administration, the
mayor publishes an annual report of his activity, mail boxes for citizens initiatives
are put up, advisory councils are set up as consultative bodies, etc. Even so, our
partner organization assesses citizens control to be inadequate.
The passivity, resignation and isolationism that negate citizens control and pub-
lic activism are a result of objective factors. The decommunization and accom-
panying disintegration of formal mass organizations have still not been balanced
by adequate processes of restructuring citizens interest in the conditions of polit-
ical democracy. This is also evidenced by the continuing negative attitudes to
the activity of both national and local NGOs.
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All this suggests that the local initiatives of Coalition 2000 also have a place in the
process of the revival of civil society and the modeling of its social role. The suc-
cess of this long-term task requires the third sector, both on a national scale and,
more specifically, at municipal level, to gain the confidence of both the local
public and local authorities, to the extent that this is possible. The recipe is a
known one: NGOs must convince people of their personal and professional
integrity, their long-term commitment to defending citizens interests, the stabil-
ity of their organizations and the efficiency of their efforts. The latter is perhaps
most important Ñ in an environment of inflated speech, first under socialism
and then in the conditions of transition, people trust deeds rather than words
and promises.
PETKAN ILIEV,
Major Assistant Professor, University of National
and World Economy
TIHOMIR BEZLOV,
Senior Fellow, Center for the Study of Democracy
LOCAL GOVERNMENT “TRANSPARENCY MATRIX”
The theorists of the so-called school of positive government explain the suc-
cesses of the small European nations with the fact that in these countries there
are more civil servants in the state administration for every 1,000 inhabitants
than in the other countries, including the large industrially developed states. In
that case, if the number of civil servants announced by Minister Tagarinski is to
be trusted, Bulgaria ought to be the most prosperous state in Europe, if not the
world. Clearly, we are an exception to the theory of this school.
What theory and practice prove, however, is that absolute faith in the honesty
of civil servants does not exist anywhere. The figure of the enterprising bureau-
crat who turns his position into a semblance of commercial enterprise has been
part and parcel of history practically from the beginnings of the state. In other
words, the problem of corruption has not been solved anywhere in the world.
Nevertheless, it is the state which narrows or broadens the possibilities of deriv-
ing personal benefits, material or otherwise.
According to present empirical studies, the average Bulgarian comes most fre-
quently in contact with corruption at the level of local government. After the dis-
mantling of the Soviet model of centralized government, local administrations in
the country were granted considerable rights and resources. At the same time,
the crisis in the state led to the disintegration of regional and national links which
turned the local administrations into lone isles of survival left to cope on their
own. The absence of a developed civil society, of independent local media and
of effective democratic local structures of the main political forces, enabled the
chaotic distribution of property, budget subsidies and contracts. Practice during
the last eight years has shown that the administrators at the local level have an
extremely short Òtime horizonÓ which creates preconditions for rapid commit-
ment to different groups and personal economic interests. In this aspect corrup-
tion at the local level has become a commonplace mechanism without which
the functioning of both business and public institutions would be impossible.
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The local government ÒTransparency MatrixÓ emerged after a number of suc-
cessive steps: expert analyses of and accompanying reports on possible risk or
Ògray sectorsÓ in municipal government, complemented by interviews with
employees at different levels of local administration, formalization of the regis-
tered problems and the creation of a common scheme, encompassing the dif-
ferent cases. Subsequently, a table was drawn up which horizontally covers the
main sectors in municipal administration Ñ Health Care, Education, Social
Welfare, etc., and vertically Ñ the amount of distributed funds, fixed funds
(wages, social security, etc.) and non-fixed funds or funds determined by the dif-
ferent bodies and levels in municipal government (See Table).
So far, the local government ÒTransparency MatrixÓ has been used experimen-
tally by the NGOs taking part in the project. Information is collected through
polls with experts, through expert reports, through accompanying interviews,
etc. The respondents and interviewees mandatorily include mayors, deputy
mayors and local administration employees, and are in addition to information
and reports about municipal budgets. With a view to the comprehensive study
of the problems of corruption and local government, the poll and interview
method is applied both to municipal administrators and employees, as well as
to potential users of municipal services.
One of the aims of the local government ÒTransparency MatrixÓ was to compare
different municipalities in the country with regard to level of transparency. Here
we will try and summarize the information we received from NGOs which took
part in the initiative for the struggle against corruption at the local level. The
Coalition 2000 project included a total of 13 such organizations, of which seven
tried to collect information about nine municipalities Ñ the municipalities of
Vratza, Bourgas, Pleven, Shoumen, Smolian and Razgrad, and three boroughs in
Plovdiv (with the exception of Plovdiv Municipality).
The local government ÒTransparency MatrixÓ revealed, no matter how paradox-
ical it may seem, that conditions for corrupt activities are missing in Bulgaria at
the level of local administration. The experiment shows that Ñ starting with the
boroughs in Plovdiv Municipality, where non-fixed expenses tend towards zero,
and ending with Smolian Municipality where they reach about 4.2% for the
Health Care sector Ñ the hands of municipal employees are tied when it comes
to the distribution of financial resources. If this is so, we will have to focus our
attention on the services provided by the municipal administrators: licenses,
responding to various requests, registration of socially disadvantaged persons,
etc. This will probably be introduced as an element of the monitoring planned
for this autumn.
Returning, however, to the initial idea of fixed and non-fixed expenses, we
come across the paradox that a municipality such as Pleven Municipality is so
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transparent that it does not have any non-fixed expenses determined by
appointed employees. In another matrix, on the other hand, the column of non-
fixed expenses, i.e. expenses determined by appointed employees, is headed by
the remark that these employees Òdo not decide, they only performÓ. In the case
of the boroughs in Plovdiv the result is understandable because the main
resources there (almost 99-100%) are determined by Plovdiv Municipality
which, meanwhile, failed to provide information for the local government
ÒTransparency Matrix.Ó In the final analysis, it turns out that the transparency
coefficient Aj (a coefficient limiting the risk of corruption) tends towards 1. From
the point of view of administrative interaction with financial resources, then,
Bulgarian municipalities are the most transparent ones in the world.
This result also suggests something else Ñ that the information provided by the
municipal administration is inaccurate to a large extent. This means that the col-
lected information should be carefully scrutinized; i.e., the financial figures pro-
vided by the municipalities should be verified in a number of different ways:
through the municipal budget (1), through municipally-funded companies like
hospitals and sanitation firms (2), through expert assessments (3) and public
opinion polls (4).
On the other hand, the completed matrixes show the need for common
approach both with regard to recording information and with regard to the
reports accompanying the matrixes.
On the basis of the information contained in the matrixes, several basic Ògray
zonesÓ were outlined in the activity of local administration. These Ògray zonesÓ
represent the different possibilities enabling the local administration to derive
benefits and, correspondingly, the possibility to participate in corrupt practices.
There are at least four levels in each Ògray zoneÓ, i.e. a gradation of the possi-
bilities of corruption in size and scale. The first level consists of cases (practices)
in the respective sector which offer the greatest possibilities both with regard to
extent and with regard to the typicalness of the activity for the sector, i.e. the
most common practice.
Health Care
¥ At first level: signing contracts for the supply of medicines through tenders
presenting offers to committees. Possibility of substituting offers.
¥ At second level: signing building contracts with ÒtrustedÓ companies and the
chance to substitute offers.
¥ At third level: paying for free medical services directly to doctors. Decisions
of medical bodies, issuing sick leave and medical certificates against pay-
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ment. Chance to steal medicines, food, fuel and building materials. Bribing
head physicians to appoint or send young doctors to specialize abroad.
¥ At fourth level: appointing Òtrusted peopleÓ by means of formal competi-
tions. Keeping them on in case of layoffs.
Education
¥ At first level: signing contracts for fuel supplies and school repairs in tender
offers. Possibility of substituting offers.
¥ At second level: signing contracts for leasing school premises for commercial
activity. Possibility of substituting offers to derive personal benefits. Failure to
observe the ordinance banning alcohol and cigarettes and the opening of
gambling halls near schools. Chance for corrupt behavior.
¥ At third level: possibility for corrupt behavior of teachers Ñ raising the marks
of pupils in core subjects and entrance exams.
¥ At fourth level: exempting pupils from school attendance against payment
and appointing ÒtrustedÓ people. Keeping them on in case of layoffs.
Social welfare
¥ At first level: possibility of including persons with undeclared incomes in the
list of people entitled to social assistance.
¥ At second level: possibility to choose ÒtrustedÓ firms for food, clothing and
fuel supply contracts.
¥ At third level: unequal distribution of donations from the country and
abroad.
¥ At fourth level: appointing ÒtrustedÓ people. Keeping them on in case of lay-
offs.
Investments
¥ At first level: possibility of substituting offers in order to benefit ÒtrustedÓ
companies when signing contracts for the design and construction of infra-
structure projects. Privatization of municipal property, benefiting relatives
and ÒtrustedÓ companies.
¥ At second level: deliberate poor control on the performance of contracts.
¥ At third level: providing inside information of strategic importance about the
results of tenders to ÒtrustedÓ companies.
¥ At fourth level: appointing ÒtrustedÓ people. Keeping them on in case of lay-
offs.
Licensing
¥ At first level: issuing business licenses to subjects not conforming to legal
requirement and criteria. Giving the best business venues to ÒtrustedÓ com-
panies.
¥ At second level: calculating a smaller area than the actually used one. Listing
a different business regime than the actual one.
¥ At third level: creating artificial obstacles for businesses rivaling ÒtrustedÓ
companies.
¥ At fourth level: appointing ÒtrustedÓ people. Keeping them on in case of lay-
offs.
Building rights
¥ At first level: chance to derive personal benefits when issuing licenses.
Turning a blind eye to illegal construction.
¥ At second level: combining official and private practice on the part of archi-
tects and construction engineers in the municipality.
Misappropriation of consumables and technology.
¥ At third level: deliberate poor control on the performance of construction
contracts.
¥ At fourth level: appointing ÒtrustedÓ people. Keeping them on in case of lay-
offs.
The corrupt practice at the local level in customs offices, described by the
Bourgas Legal Community within the framework of the Coalition 2000 Small
Projects Program provides an interesting example. (3) Studies of this kind also
need to be carried out by other local partners in order to confirm and comple-
ment the practices described by this organization.
The different segments of the matrix also require different methods of collecting
information. Thus, for example, the schemes of influence on local government
require the informal gathering of information from all political forces (taking or
not taking part in local government, ruling or opposition forces). Interviews
rather than opinion polls should be used here as the more appropriate method.
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As already mentioned, unified methods will be needed to complete the matrix
in future.
In the final analysis, the legal rules interpreted by the local administration enable
expenses to be almost completely referred to the Òfixed expensesÓ section since
they are predetermined by the municipal budget, which is approved by the local
parliament (municipal council). This blurs responsibilities and reduces the prob-
lem of transparency to the question of who in the municipality does, after all,
decide the distribution of budget funds as time and sums. In other words,
regardless of the fact that this resource is specifically earmarked (e.g. for hospi-
tal ÒXÓ) and predetermined in size, it must nevertheless be duly received (by
payment order, for example). This means that there is a concrete civil servant on
whom this operation depends. In this light, the possibility of corruption exists
and this expenditure can be referred to non-fixed expenses. Precisely this should
be taken into account in the future completion of the matrix in order to avoid
ending up with the paradox that all expenses are fixed, i.e. predetermined by
the municipal budget.
We will try and present some observations on the problems emerging in col-
lecting information.
As a whole, it may be claimed that NGOs did not come across open opposition
by the local administrations anywhere in the country. At the same time, howev-
er, two main schemes were used by the local administrations which made
access to information difficult:
¥ despite demonstrated willingness for cooperation, information was not pro-
vided. There were different ways to this approach: accountants and
financiers ÒforgotÓ about the mayorÕs instruction, or else the matter was post-
poned and a futile search began for the proper employee equipped to pro-
vide the desired information (a typical case: information about the leasing of
beaches).
¥ information was provided, but only in general terms which did not enable
any analysis to be carried out.
It should be noted that the NGOs were able to find their own ways of collecting
the necessary information. Unfortunately, the short time within which the infor-
mation had to be prepared precluded the exhaustiveness necessary to enable us
to compare the nine municipalities.
It should also be noted that the actual ÒinstrumentÓ for systematizing and for-
malizing this information, the so-called Òtransparency matrixÓ, was not suffi-
ciently universal and accurate. Thus, for example, the typical Ògray zonesÓ such
as tenders for the supply of food products, fuel and consumables were almost
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absent in small and medium-large municipalities, in contrast to big ones. This is
due to the fact that there is little chance of making any extra profit in supplying
hospitals, schools and social establishments. Towns like Razgrad and Smolian
are an example of this.
In reporting the results of this first stage, it should be pointed out that a number
of interesting trends were outlined during our work which are largely subject to
discussion.
¥ Unclear distribution of the responsibility of local and central government.
The most typical and frequently cited cases refer to building permits, and the
possibility of a number of civil servants at middle municipal and middle
national level to delay or speed up, to stop or permit construction. The
appointment of directors of hospitals, schools, social and police services cre-
ates a peculiar situation in which the responsibilities for the distribution of
resources are blurred.
¥ The analysis of the different cases which may be defined as Òcorrupt prac-
ticesÓ revealed that the appointment of people especially in small munici-
palities often becomes a basic corruption resource. The question arises of
how to measure and assess this Ògray zoneÓ.
¥ One of the biggest problems at the local government level is the borderline
between ÒfriendlyÓ and Òbought serviceÓ. This problem is becoming even
more complicated when considering that the territory of Ònon-pecuniary
bribesÓ is expanded in small municipalities by ÒmiddlemenÓ and third per-
sons Ñ friends, relatives or fellow party members. The extreme tolerance of
such forms of corruption make anti-corruption efforts extremely difficult.
¥ The problem of imitated control. Municipal committees are a typical exam-
ple in this respect. Considered formally, there are only a few municipalities
in which these committees have not adapted to the new forms. According to
the comments of NGOs, however, municipal committees are a typical form
of imitating control. It suffices to take a look at the minutes of their meetings
to realize the problem of imitation. Typically, one person, usually the com-
mittee chairman, Òguides the committeeÓ. The situation is similar in different
municipalities in the country where even public organizations which imitate
public control are sometimes included. Possibly one of the biggest challenges
in this respect is how to distinguish imitated transparency from genuine
transparency.
¥ The problem of the proportion between formal and real management is also
worthy of special discussion. A typical example is the approval and pegging
of all or almost all expenditures according to sector (health care, education,
social welfare, etc.) although the final expenditure is determined by the
38 Local Anti-Corruption Initiatives
Local Government “Transparency Matrix” 39
mayor or one of his deputies. After that the Òsmall scandalÓ in the local par-
liament is of very little importance.
A basic problem in collecting information about the finances of municipalities
(budget, incomes, expenses) is seen in the Òmayor-financierÓ relation. In many
cases the written authorization of the mayor is not sufficient reason for the
respective employee to provide the required information, despite that it should
be accessible to all. This applies to almost any Òsensitive informationÓ such as
information about tenders, building permits, etc.
¥ A concrete problem emerged in Plovdiv where Plovdiv Municipality did not
provide complete information, in contrast to the borough mayors who, as a
whole, proved more obliging. It should be mentioned, however, that most of
the budget expenses of the boroughs (100% in some cases) refer to Òfixed
expensesÓ, whereas Ònon-fixed expensesÓ are concentrated in a huge
municipal company, Plovdivinvest, which is subordinate to Plovdiv
Municipality. Thus, despite being legally entitled to this, the boroughs are
unable to distribute and expend a large part of the public resource.
Due to the great relative share of fixed expenses, Òbig corruptionÓ (the distribu-
tion of budget funds) by appointed employees in the regional administration is
financially limited. What we have here instead is the so-called Òsmall corrup-
tionÓ linked with certain administrative services (applications, permits, licenses,
etc.).
All these problems will have to be eliminated the next time information is gath-
ered for the matrix. On the basis of the accumulated experience, the range of
used methods will probably also be expanded, including the use of expert analy-
sis.
Good prospects are also opening up thanks to the initiatives of regional NGOs
which offer possibilities for development, for example, by creating objective
indexes of the state of the different municipalities. The attempt in Shoumen
(Center for the Study of Political Processes) to analyze applications filed by citi-
zens and administrative suits filed against the municipality is a very interesting
approach. The attempts to conduct regular sociological surveys among citizens
having contacts with local administration (Plovdiv and Smolian), as well as mon-
itoring the coverage of the theme of corruption in the local print media
(Razgrad) are also interesting.
The public committees set up for the struggle against corruption (Shoumen,
Plovdiv, Smolian) provide a good possibility for the development of the Òtrans-
parency matrixÓ. Such organizations can indeed deal with the real zones of cor-
ruption and try to realize systematic rather than spontaneous control.
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Municipality Profile
General features: state subsidy, ratio between the size of the subsidy and the size of
the population of the respective municipality, adequacy of the state subsidy with
regard to the social needs of the municipality (unemployment rates, minority
representation, percentage of working enterprises, infrastructure problems, etc. )
Description of local government structures (chart and connections within
municipality - flowchart )
Health Care Education Social
Services
Culture Investments Licensing Building Rights Environment
and sanitation
Size of funds allocated
(An absolute amount
and a percentage of the
municipal budget)
Fixed expenditures:
Pay-roll costs, social
security spending, etc.
Subsistence costs -
electricity, water, etc.
Other fixed expenses
Comments
Expenditures
determined by elected
officials
Expenses determined
by appointed officials
Foot and heating
Repair and
maintenance work
Special expenses
Decision makers and
domain of their
responsibility
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Low-ranking officials
Problems:
Criteria for recruiting
members of the
Commissions entitled
to allocate municipal
funds
Criteria for the
appointment of
municipal officials
Business interests in
the respective sector
Schemes for
influencing local
authorities
Economic influence:
Sponsorship, grants,
joint activities
Political influence:
Appointment by
political protections,
lobbying aimed at
obtaining municipal
funds
Sector supervision
(bodies, regulations
and procedures)
Ways to supervise the
activities of the mayor
and the deputy-
mayor
Ways to supervise the
activities of the
Municipal Council
Ways to supervise the
activities of municipal
officials
Possible Ògray areasÓ
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NOTES
1. Local Government ÒTransparency MatrixÓ
2. Our schematic assessment formula, based on the comparison of fixed and
non-fixed expenses has conditionally been called Òcorruption activity risk
coefficientÓ. Our aim is to further develop the proposed scheme by devel-
oping more accurate formulas for comparison after sufficient information has
been accumulated.
3. Customs/corrupt practices
Ð Falsely documenting taxed goods. Listing tariff positions requiring less duty.
Ð Letting goods through without any customs documents.
Ð Using schemes to evade the restrictive regime, e.g. the ban on the export of
breeding stock is circumvented by mixed batches with a common certificate
of lower quality.
Ð In working with regular clients/businessmen, teams are formed with which
the transfer of goods is agreed on in advance.
PART TWO
LOCAL ANTI-CORRUPTION
INITIATIVES
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A. Local Monitoring
SVETLOZAR KOSTOV,
Expert, Black Sea Law Community
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BOURGAS JURISTS ON CORRUPTION: OPINION
POLL OF THE BLACK SEA LAW COMMUNITY
The study was conducted on the basis of a project of and by a team of the Black
Sea Legal Community. One of the established professional elites formed the tar-
get group. Ninety jurists from almost all legal professions were polled: judges,
lawyers, prosecutors, legal advisers, researchers and law students. Every profes-
sional community has its own specifics which must be taken into account both
in preparing and conducting the study, as well as in processing the obtained
information. The specific features in this case include higher general education,
possession of special knowledge about corruption (as a phenomenon punish-
able by law), and greater possibilities of coming into contact with this phenom-
enon. Another interesting feature which emerged in the analysis of the collect-
ed information was the highly skeptical attitude of jurists regarding the effec-
tiveness of the struggle against corruption.
The study was conducted during the second half of May 1999 in the city of
Bourgas.
Main goals: examining the view of jurists on corruption, the spheres of life in
which it thrives, and the factors which cause it.
Aim of the study: to reveal the spheres in society in which corruption is most
widespread in order to enable NGOs to focus their efforts on them, both for
study and counteraction.
Method of procedure: the study was completely anonymous, covering a ran-
dom sample of respondents, regardless of type of legal profession, years of ser-
vice, special field, prestige in the guild and other socio-demographic factors.
Almost all questions were partly or fully open, enabling the respondents to write
down or complete (to different degrees) the answer of their choice.
As regards content, the first question aimed to establish the view of jurists of the
nature of corruption. The respondents had a multiple choice of five definitions
but were allowed to give more than one answer. Most of them defined corrup-
tion as ÒbriberyÓ (68 answers or 75.5%) and ÒvenalityÓ (45 answers or 50%)
(Table 1). This view of corruption is only logical since it describes the two
approaches and the two parties involved in a corrupt deal. In fact, this concept
of corruption comes closest to the legal definition of the phenomenon in Article
301 of the Penal Code (the crime of SUBORNATION). An almost equal number
of respondents chose ÒdemoralizationÓ (28), ÒdepravityÓ (26) and Òdegenera-
tionÓ (17) which are different aspects of the moral side of the question.
TABLE 1. Corruption is:
Bribery 75.5%
Venality 50.0%
Demoralization 28.0%
Depravity 26.0%
Degeneration 17.0%
No answer 6.7%
The frequent combination of answers of the first and second group warrant the
conclusion that, besides possessing the necessary intellectual knowledge of cor-
ruption, jurists also clearly express their permanent negative attitude to this phe-
nomenon. This conclusion is also supported by the fact that only six of the
respondents (6.7%) found it difficult to define corruption and/or did not accept
any of the possible options.
In answering the second question: ÒDo you come across corruption in your daily
life?Ó, an equal number of respondents (6) claim that they have never done so.
According to the rest (over 93%), the presence of corruption in our reality is
indisputable and most prevalent in health care and customs (73 answers or
81%), followed by state administration (60 answers or 67%), the judicial system
(59 answers or 66%), municipal administration (56 answers or 62%), privatiza-
tion (48 answers or 53%), education (41 answers or 46%), land reform (40
answers or 44%) and construction (36 answers or 40%). (Table 2). In addition to
these nine possible answers, the respondents also cited another four spheres
where corruption is rampant: politics, trade, the Interior Ministry system and the
Bar Association. The sum total of the percentages for this, as well as for the other
questions exceeds 100% because the respondents were allowed to give more
than one answer. It is obvious that jurists consider Bulgarian society to be seri-
ously affected by this phenomenon.
TABLE 2. Corruption is most frequent in:
Customs 81%
Health care 81%
State administration 67%
Judicial system 66%
Municipal administration 62%
Privatization 53%
Education 46%
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Land reform 44%
Construction 40%
The answers to the third question regarding the reasons for corruption proved
particularly interesting. The respondents were again able to pick more than one
of the possible answers, as well as to add their own. Most jurists (68 or over 73%)
consider the low living standard of the population in Bulgaria as the main factor
breeding corruption (Table 3). In this sense, one of the respondents also added
the countryÕs bad economic state and the dependence on foreign subsidies. As
second in importance the respondents cited inadequate law enforcement,
expressed in the answers of non-punishability of offenders (61) and poor control on
observance of the laws (56), i.e. 68% and 62%, respectively. Another important
factor is the lack of transparency in the activity of local and state bodies (42 or 47%).
One of the respondents also cited another aspect of this Ñ the sluggish admin-
istration. An equal number of respondents (33) opted for lack of coordination
between control bodies and inept legislation. Least importance was attached to the
lack of information about the legislative process (9 answers or 10%). Among the
individually added factors of corruption, the following are most interesting: Òthe
deep-seated conviction that you have to pay for having a problem solvedÓ, Òthe
lack of tradition in establishing a market economyÓ, and Òthe absence of a sta-
ble value system in our societyÓ.
TABLE 3. Reasons for corruption:
Low living standard 73%
Non-punishability of offenders 68%
Poor control on observance of the laws 62%
Lack of transparency in the activity of local and state bodies 47%
Lack of coordination between control bodies 37%
Inept legislation 37%
Lack of information about the legislative process 10%
These figures show that jurists do not regard the human factor as the most
blameworthy in a situation of bribery, since they place low living standard and
the lack of or poor law enforcement at the top of the list of the reasons for cor-
ruption. The trend to explain the corruption of a civil servant with external cir-
cumstances gives cause for alarm because it tends to exonerate and relieve him
of personal responsibility in consciously deciding to transgress, if not the laws, at
least the moral standards of society.
This could possibly explain the respondentsÕ marked skepticism on the question
about the effectiveness of a broad public discussion on the problem of corrup-
tion and creating an attitude of intolerance to it. Thirty-six or 40% of the respon-
dents do not think that the campaign against this phenomenon is going to
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change anything in society. Greater expectations are pinned on other, more
concrete measures (economic, political, legislative, etc.). Many of them regard
the initiation of a widespread public debate merely as a ÒbasisÓ and ÒbeginningÓ
of more effective actions.
The analysis of the answers concerning the factors breeding corruption enables
the deduction of some basic guidelines for counteracting it. In the opinion of
respondents, the necessary measures should be graded in the following order of
importance: first Ñ raising peopleÕs living standard, second Ñ punishing any
committed violations, third Ñ strict law enforcement. This is followed by trans-
parency in the activity and optimization of the work of the administration,
improved legislation, etc.
In the end, the jurists were asked to briefly describe an instance of corruption
that they had experienced. Oddly enough, 63 of them, or 70 percent, failed to
answer this question. Another 10 or 11 percent gave quite general formulations
or answers, ranging from ÒSituations like this happen every dayÓ and ÒNothing
can be done without connections, acquaintances and moneyÓ to ÒFortunately I
personally have never been in such a situationÓ. Only 17 persons, or 19 percent
of the respondents, cited concrete cases.
Some of the possible reasons for the reticence of the respondents are contained
in the following answers: ÒI donÕt want to cite a situation I have experienced.
The absence of a signature does not necessarily mean anonymity since the ques-
tionnaire is filled out in oneÕs own handwriting and giving a bribe is also a
crime.Ó Or ÒI am a state body and if I say that I have not been offered such alter-
natives I would be lying. This is a matter of judgement and personal moral.
Society itself is not sufficiently mature and developed and accepts so-called Ôcor-
ruptionÕ as something normal. We all go to state-run health institutions with at
least a box of chocolates, donÕt we?Ó
In absolute number and with regard to spheres of manifestation of corruption
the described concrete cases largely confirm the above-mentioned findings.
Most of the examples are in the realm of health care Ñ seven in all. They are
followed by the police and education Ñ four each, municipal administration Ñ
two, and the judicial system Ñ one.
The following frank answer is perhaps most telling and emotionally colored: ÒI
am 34 years old. Regardless of the fact that I have been pregnant twice, in both
cases I was refused the necessary medical assistance in the maternity ward
(because I did not pay) and now I have no children, nor will I have any, due to
my lack of money to pay the corrupt medical employees.Ó
The thus described results of the poll among the 90 jurists warrant the following
general conclusions and recommendations:
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¥ Corruption is an extremely widespread phenomenon in Bulgarian society.
The social conditions of the transition in economic, political and moral val-
ues stimulate the development of forms and instances of corruption.
¥ Experienced as most painful by ordinary people is the so-called mass (every-
day) corruption, i.e. the widespread corruption in administrative services,
customs, hospitals, the police and schools.
¥ Due to their specific work jurists often come into contact with corruption.
They are familiar with it, but only a relatively small part of them succumb to
it. At the same time, there are serious doubts concerning the effectiveness of
the ongoing struggle against corruption.
¥ In this connection it would be interesting to establish which of the legal pro-
fessions produces greater skepticism among practicing jurists, compared to
the rest. In future polls of this kind the respondents could, for example, be
asked to name their legal profession under explicit guarantee of anonymity.
¥ NGOs should focus greater efforts on their work among jurists. They should
try to maximally use their knowledge and potential in the struggle against
corruption by attracting them as members or involving them as partners in
networks with their organizations. Considering the sizable public presence of
the legal profession, this would serve to multiply the effect of the counterac-
tion of corruption.
¥ There is an extremely great need to broaden and improve the legal frame-
work of the struggle against corruption. The terms describing the different
forms and manifestations of this phenomenon need to be defined much
more accurately and in greater detail, since the clear awareness of which act
is an act of corruption and what legal consequences it entails has a large pre-
ventive effect in an individual psychological aspect and hence also in a social
aspect. Once again, jurists in the structures of civil society should be the ini-
tiator and motor of changes and improvements in this respect.
¥ Special attention should be paid to the development, with the participation
of NGOs, of practical strategies and programs for counteracting corruption,
for making full use of the possibilities of specialists in different fields with a
bearing on the problem, and to actively adapting the accumulated wealth of
foreign experience to Bulgarian conditions.
¥ In conclusion, the various citizensÕ measures against corruption can only be
successful if they naturally complement other widespread actions aimed at
limiting above all the economic realm for the manifestation of corruption.
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CORRUPTION IN THE MUNICIPAL ADMINISTRATION
OF VRATZA: TWO POINTS OF VIEW
I. VOX POPULI: ASSESSMENT OF THE LEVEL OF COR-
RUPTION ACCORDING TO A STUDY CONDUCTED IN
VRATZA BY A TEAM OF THE FOUNDATION FOR
ENTREPRENEURSHIP DEVELOPMENT
Within the framework of the Coalition 2000 process, in May 1999 the Foundation
for Entrepreneurship Development conducted an opinion poll among the
townÕs population. It covered two groups: representatives of small and medium-
sized business, and citizens. Here are its most important results:
Fifteen percent of the respondents said they had been faced with attempts of
being forced to give bribes. Half of them said that this happened less than three
months ago. One third of the respondents said they had never been faced with
such attempts, the rest refused to answer.
The majority of the respondents (45%) consider that only some public servants
are corrupt, whilst 35% believe that Òalmost all public servants are involved in
corruptionÓ or that Òmost public servants are involved in itÓ.
The representatives of the General Customs Directorate (85%), tax administra-
tion (60%), judges and doctors (40% each), MPs (35%) and police officers
(30%) are regarded as being most corrupt. They are followed by the bodies of
executive power at central/regional level (ministers, regional governors and their
deputies) and at local level (mayors, their deputies, etc.), named by 25% of the
respondents. Oddly enough, prosecutors (20%) and investigators (15%) are
considered far less corrupt than judges. This could partly be explained by the
position of judges to decree the final decision (sentence), thus affecting more
interests. A role is also played by public attitudes shaped by the mass media Ñ
for example, the court, doctors and customs are a particularly frequent target of
negative reports.
The citizens of Vratza particularly resent acts of corruption which directly affect
their daily life Ñ obtaining documents, medical treatment, settling disputes, etc.
This is why they tend to be more critical of manifestations of corruption by low-
ranking officials who stifle their individual initiatives. Corruption in the sphere of
big business (the product of market decentralization and liberalization) does not
concern them as much. Oddly enough, despite the fact that none of the respon-
dents regarded the claim of Òtransparency of proceduresÓ in administrative
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activity as true, only 10% consider the lack of transparency in privatization, ten-
ders, public contracts and the like to be a serious obstacle.
Factors causing and favoring the spread of corruption
CONCLUSIONS:
1. Both citizens and local business representatives consider corruption as one of
the biggest problems which hamper economic development and make peo-
pleÕs everyday life difficult.
2. So far, the executive, legislative and judiciary have failed to cope successfully
with corruption. One reason is the existing corruption within them. It is bred
by a number of factors: low labor remuneration, work in an unstable envi-
ronment, frequent change of laws and ordinances, constant replacement of
management personnel, etc.
3. The institutional capacity for struggle against corruption is unsatisfactory,
including the possibility for resolute anti-corruption measures by judges,
prosecutors, investigators and the police.
Outside factors Respondents Ñ % Subjective factors Respondents Ñ %
Companies Citizens Companies Citizens
1. Low wages of
public servants 88 55
2. Striving for
personal
enrichment of
people in power
35 50
3. Intertwining of
official obligations
with personal
interests
40 40
4. Imperfect
legislation
40 35
5. Lack of strict
administrative
control
40 35
6. Ineffective
judicial system
22 30
7. Moral crisis in
the period of
transition
10 30
8. Problems
inherited from
the past
6 20
4. An important precondition for the central governmentÕs struggle against cor-
ruption is the adoption of measures for:
¥ creating the necessary laws and procedures for struggle against corruption
¥ viable taxation system
¥ laws and ordinances regulating the market, banks and commercial transac-
tions.
5. Effective anti-corruption activity is impossible unless the adopted statutory
acts are successfully applied.
6. There is no public intolerance of corruption: Òpeople observe the law only
when it suits themÓ.
7. The development of regional and municipal programs for struggle against cor-
ruption would be an important element for successful anti-corruption activi-
ties.
II. EXPERT OPINION: CORRUPTION IN THE MUNICIPAL
ADMINISTRATION IN VRATZA (1)
The quality of administrative services and the work of the municipal administra-
tion and the municipal leadership is assessed as poor by citizens. This is due
mainly to the lack of transparency of most municipal activities and procedures,
as well as to the insufficient professionalism of some municipal employees.
On the other hand, subjective factors also contribute to the spread and deep-
ening of corruption, i.e. the striving for personal enrichment at any price and as
quickly as possible. Quite often, official obligations are also closely intertwined
with personal interests.
The biggest scandals caused by corruption in municipal administration are
linked with the acquisition of budget funds, distributed for different activities:
1) The fact cannot be ignored that all contracts with partners are signed only by
the mayor. But before reaching him the contract is coordinated in different
departments, depending on its object. This system should exclude arbitrary
acts by individual employees in the administration. Unfortunately, however,
on the one hand it is a bribe-taking machine at different levels and, on the
other, it collectively misleads the mayor to such an extent that it is subse-
quently difficult to prove who is to blame and exactly who signed the docu-
ment which runs counter to the interests of the municipality.
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The situation is particularly drastic with regard to the leasing of temporary busi-
ness sites, parking lots and plots. Due to the huge number of small and tiny firms
wanting to start business this way, the stakes are so high that the money paid for
rent to the municipality is but a token sum of the money paid for getting the
desired plot, shed or temporary business site. As a result, the whole town, and
especially the central part, is dotted with all sorts of ugly and unappealing street
stalls, etc. And all this under the pretense of aiding small and medium-sized
business.
2) Corruption practices also evolve within the framework of municipal invest-
ment programs and infrastructure. They include new construction, capital
repairs, roads, street lighting, garbage collection and dumping grounds. The
money is distributed when the municipal budget is prepared and approved.
The expenditure of these funds is controlled by the Investment Policy depart-
ment. Its employees are linked with some of the most glaring cases of cor-
ruption. They all work with their own circle of companies to which municipal
contracts are assigned and in practice money is siphoned off. This sometimes
even happens under ÒstrictÓ observance of the requirements of assigning con-
tracts through tenders.
3) Wide possibilities for corruption are also provided by the so-called ÒBuilding
RightÓ. The legal framework which frequently changes the regulations of this
type of activity is also ÒconduciveÓ to this. Construction is controlled by three
teams: local administration, a special commission in the system of Municipal
Administration which monitors and approves the town plan, and a state build-
ing supervision inspectorate which looks out for illegal construction. This legal
framework strongly favors low-ranking employees. Architects and construc-
tion engineers in the municipal administration ÒcombineÓ public work with
private practice. Thus, citizens who need their approval for a given docu-
ment, ÒvoluntarilyÓ assign the project to the municipal employees. In addi-
tion, municipal technology and consumables are used for private purposes
both during and outside working hours.
4) The even more rampant corruption in hospital institutions and in municipal
hospitals, above all, cannot be ignored either.
The thus observed state of corruption in Vratza warrants the conclusion that
interpersonal relationships have been damaged and the moral system has been
degraded to a large extent because manifestations of corruption are an act
which involves two parties Ñ those who demand bribes and those who agree to
give them.
For this reason, an important prerequisite for the struggle against corruption is to
take actions for:
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¥ creating a legal framework which exactly defines and regulates market rela-
tions and commercial transactions
¥ drafting laws for struggle against corruption
¥ developing individual municipal programs to combat corruption
¥ increasing citizens intolerance.
NOTES
1. We are referring to the so-called Òentourage interviewÓ, i.e. an interview
with a qualified expert whose anonymity has been guaranteed in advance.
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Expert, Regional Association
ÒFor the Revival of Civil Society,Ó Pleven
ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS FROM A TELEPHONE
SURVEY WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE
“CITIZENS — CORRUPTION — LOCAL
ADMINISTRATION” PROJECT
1. METHODOLOGY
Subject of study: 171 adult citizens in the city of Pleven
Method: Telephone poll
Choice of respondents: Simple random sample on the basis of home telephone
numbers.
Starting number: 16, step Ñ 133
Representativeness: Due to the limited size of the sample, the results are not
representative of the studied total. In this sense the study is a probing one. Its
aim is reduced to analyzing some trends in public opinion with a view to the
concrete goals of the project.
Description of the studied sample: a total of 171 adult citizens in the city of
Pleven, divided as follows:
1. By sex: men Ñ 40%, women Ñ 60%. (See Chart 1)
CHART 1. Distribution by sex
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2. By age: 18-30 years Ñ 12%, 31-40 years Ñ 26%, 41-50 years Ñ 32%, 51-
60 years Ñ 17%, over 60 years Ñ 13%. (See Chart 2)
CHART 2. Distribution by age
3. By education: primary Ñ 13%, secondary Ñ 48%, college and university Ñ
39%. (See Chart 3)
CHART 3. Distribution by education
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4. Social status
Students Ñ 0.5%, workers Ñ 8.5%, employees Ñ 22%, farmers Ñ 2%, intel-
lectuals Ñ 8%, pensioners Ñ 23%, unemployed Ñ 25%, private entrepre-
neurs Ñ 9%, disabled Ñ 2%. (See Chart 4)
CHART 4. Distribution by social status
5. Length of residence in Pleven
Since birth Ñ 45%, over 20 years Ñ 30%, between 10 and 20 years Ñ 13%,
between 5 and 10 years Ñ 7%, less than 5 years Ñ 5%. (See Chart 5)
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CHART 5. Distribution by length of residence in Pleven
Note: In view of the characteristics of the studied sample it should again be
stressed that the cited results outline only certain tendencies.
2. PUBLIC OPINION ON THE QUALITY OF ADMINISTRATIVE
SERVICES IN PLEVEN MUNICIPALITY
According to the results of the poll, 54 percent of the respondents used the ser-
vices of local administration, whilst 46 percent did not use these services. (See
Chart 6)
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CHART 6. Have you used local administration services?
Dissatisfied users predominate among those who say they used administrative
services. Complaints concern mainly the speed of service: served quickly Ñ
37%, served slowly Ñ 63% (Chart 7); and competent information received: yes
Ñ 40%, no Ñ 60% (Chart 8).
CHART 7. Local administration services
CHART 8. Were you given competent information?
No
60%
Yes
40%
Slow
63%
Quick
37%
No
46%
Yes
54%
60 Local Anti-Corruption Initiatives
Citizens are satisfied with the polite attitude of employees in 59% of the
cases and dissatisfied in 41%.
The results show that 22 percent of the citizens who used municipal administra-
tion services claim that they had to pay for them. It appears that they are unclear
about the difference between the cost of services and the expenses for duty,
stamps, appraisals, etc. In this sense only a few people know that administrative
services are free of charge.
The biggest percentage of citizens used the services of the Regional and Urban
Planning and Construction Department Ñ 22% and the Municipal Property
Department Ñ 15%, followed by the Health and Social Work Department Ñ
12% and the Economic Development, Trade and Services Department Ñ 11%.
As a whole, the quality of services is assessed as negative, with the exception of
Education: satisfied Ñ 61%, dissatisfied Ñ 39%, and Administrative
Organizational Services: satisfied Ñ 58%, dissatisfied Ñ 42%. (Table 1)
TABLE 1. Your assessment of the quality of services:
Departments Satisfied Dissatisfied
Education 61% 39%
Administrative
Organizational Services 8% 42%
Municipal Property 17% 83%
Economic Development,
Trade and Services 22% 78%
Culture 27% 73%
Regional and Urban Planning
and Construction 30% 70%
Citizens are most dissatisfied with the services of the Municipal Property
Department Ñ 83%, followed by the Economic Development, Trade and
Services Department Ñ 78%, the Culture Department Ñ 73%, and the
Regional and Urban Planning and Construction Department Ñ 70%.
3. CORRUPTION IN LOCAL ADMINISTRATION IN THE
EYES OF PUBLIC OPINION. CITIZEN ASSESSMENT OF
THE EXTENT TO WHICH CORRUPTION IS A WIDESPREAD
PHENOMENON AMONG LOCAL ADMINISTRATION
EMPLOYEES
Only one tenth of the respondents believe that there are hardly any corrupt
employees in local administration. The rest consider that more or less of them
are corrupt. Almost all Ñ 6%, most Ñ 32%, some Ñ 28%, hardly any Ñ 11%,
undecided Ñ 23%.
CHART 9. Corrupt employees in local administration:
No doubt, the bulk of public opinion is that corruption is widely present in local
administration. Moreover, many are convinced that this is the only way to
obtain quick and quality services.
Of the 31% of citizens who claim that they would not offer to pay for such ser-
vices, 24% simply donÕt have the money and a mere 7% are convinced that the
employees would refuse a bribe.
A total of 47% would offer money, 31% would not, and 22% are undecided.
(Chart 10)
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CHART 10. Would you offer money?
Corruption is not only registered by public opinion. It is about to become a pub-
licly admissible, commonplace phenomenon. Potential willingness for corrupt
actions is evidenced among a considerable part of citizens.
Corruption still retains its negative moral character in the mind of citizens,
although it is accepted as a Ònecessary evilÓ. The projection technique shows
that the respondents, put in the place of the municipal employees, believe that:
they would accept bribes Ñ 8%, depending on circumstances Ñ 26%, refuse
bribes Ñ 51%, undecided Ñ 15%. (Chart 11)
Chart 11. Would you accept a bribe?
4. RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Heightening the quality of administrative services necessitates the operation
of a consultative information center which will orient citizens concerning the
place, time and kinds of services, and provide competent legal assistance
about the mechanisms and way of solving the problem.
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2. It is necessary to provide public information about the specific activities of
the municipal administration, adapted to the practical needs of citizens.
3. It is necessary to train employees of the busiest offices in specific techniques
of communication with citizens and the settling of disputes.
4. It is necessary, with the aid of NGOs, to provide free legal advice to citizens
who do not know how to solve their administrative problems.
5. It is necessary to optimize the overall organization of administrative services.
6. A key measure against the spread of corruption is to heighten the awareness
and legal training of citizens with the aid of NGOs and the media.
7. From a statutory point of view it is necessary to reduce to a minimum the
local administrationÕs power to issue permits. Restricting the powers of
employees to subjectively decide matters can be achieved by guaranteeing
greater openness and transparency in the decision-making mechanisms.
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B. Anti-corruption Structures
BORISLAV TSEKOV
President of the Association of Young Lawyers,
Member of the World Jurist Association
INTERMEDIARY GROUPS: A MECHANISM
FOR CURBING CORRUPTION PRESSURE
IN MUNICIPALITIES
In mid-1998, the Association of Young Lawyers of Bulgaria (AYL) created an
expert team on anti-corruption issues and initiatives related to combating cor-
ruption. At this stage, the program, which we have called ÒAnti-corruption Civic
InitiativeÓ, funded by the US Embassy in Sofia and Coalition 2000, consists of pro-
jects implemented at the municipal level (in four municipalities). The program
also has an international dimension Ñ AYL will host a conference of the World
Jurist Association on 1 October 1999 in Sofia on ÒLegal Instruments for
Enhancing the Transparency, Openness and Accountability of Governments.Ó
Prominent legal professionals from the USA, Germany, Russia, Ukraine and
other countries will take part in it. The foreign speakers will include Mr. Nihal
Jayawickrama, Transparency International Executive Director, and Prof. Garry
Hunter from Ohio University, USA, who has devoted many years of his profes-
sional activity to the problems of corruption.
Our activity at the local level has convinced us of the following:
¥ there is a necessity for independent civic structures to assist citizens in their
relations with the local authorities and to monitor the activities of the munic-
ipal bodies; 
¥ there is the belief that combating corruption means only law enforcement
and punishment for the guilty, and not enhancement of transparency,
awareness building and improving of citizens knowledge about their rights
and the functions and powers of the public bodies.
Guided by such observations and by our understanding of the role of NGOs in
combating corruption, we have concentrated our efforts on creating a model for
action at the municipal level through which:
¥ citizens can be assisted in realizing their rights, and their legal knowledge can
be enhanced concerning the administrative services provided by the local
authorities;
¥ civic control can be exercised over the local authorities, aimed at restricting
corruption;
¥ public awareness can be built and a public intolerance towards corruption
can be fostered;
¥ transparency of the local authorities can be improved regarding important
local projects funded by the municipal budgets or related to the lending of
municipal property.
These projects provide for the realizing of concrete anti-corruption initiatives at
the municipal level, implemented by organized groups of experts called
ÒIntermediary Groups.Ó They fight corruption by creating offices for consultation
with affected citizens. Their basic role is to take a stand against maladministra-
tion, unlawful or unreasonable acts or actions, delays of process, negligence or
any other bureaucratic abuses, which on a mass scale compel the citizens to
hand out bribes to the local officials in order to realize their rights and lawful
interests. This is a general practice which, above all, undermines the citizensÕ
confidence in the institutions and the legal order in this country.
The Intermediary Groups consist of lawyers, journalists and volunteers, and are
designed to mediate between the citizens and the local authorities regarding the
administrative services. In case of unlawful or unreasonable acts or actions of the
local administration, or in case of unlawful delays of process, the Groups assist
the citizens with preparation of documents, legal advice and advocacy before
the municipal administrative bodies, and if necessary they help the citizens to
file complaints before higher municipal bodies according to the Proposals,
Signals, Complaints and Petitions Act. This Act was adopted before 1989 and is
not adequate to contemporary social realities. However, it provides for certain
mechanisms, procedures and obligations for the authorities to answer to signals
for corruption and proposals regarding improvements in the administration sub-
mitted by citizens or organizations. Let me say that we are planning to draft pro-
posals for a new, modern law to guarantee the rights of citizens to petition and
will submit these draft proposals to the standing parliamentary committees and
to the Council of Ministers. We consider the work of our Intermediary Groups
so far quite satisfactory Ñ more than 200 citizens have been consulted during
the last two months in the four municipalities we are working in. In order to
facilitate the work of our groups we have prepared and xeroxed standardized
forms for written consultations, signals and proposals, as well as information
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materials for the reception rooms and for the other activities of our organization
within the scope of the said project.
Another priority of the Intermediary Groups is monitoring the activities and poli-
cies of the local authorities with regard to restricting corruption and the violation
of the rights and the lawful interests of citizens through maladministration. The
monitoring process will result in special reports and recommendations for
improving the organization and procedures of the municipal bodies. These
reports will be presented to the local authorities, the media and local NGOs.
With a view to increasing the transparency of the local authorities and enhanc-
ing the role of NGOs in public policy making, the Groups will gather and
announce information about important local projects funded by the municipal
budgets.
We consider as very important the publication of CitizensÕ Handbooks present-
ing the legal regulations in a wide scope of municipal administrative services
(e.g. certificates, authorizations, licenses) and in a format that is synthesized and
understandable to the layperson. The handbooks will be distributed within the
local communities Ñ to citizens, businesses and NGOs. I believe that the hand-
books concerned will be an efficient assistant to the citizens and a real guide in
the labyrinth of the administrative services, bodies, documentation and proce-
dures.
Mail boxes have been announced where citizens, whose anonymity is guaran-
teed, have the opportunity to send signals about corruption among the local
authorities.
We are in permanent dialogue with local authorities through a number of work-
shops and round table discussions on issues like the functioning of the munici-
pal authorities, access to information and amendments in local regulations
aimed at reducing licensing procedures. One practical result of this dialogue is
the participation of representatives of AYL in working groups on drafting local
plans for combating corruption in two of the municipalities.
This mediation between the citizens and local authorities, along with civic con-
trol and the improving of legal knowledge, are the basic instruments for NGOs
in combating corruption. In this sense the Coalition 2000 process should be
directed even more toward working on the local level. Local NGO coalitions,
consisting of both organizations committed to the anti-corruption issues and also
NGOs with other areas of activity, should be created in the municipalities. They
should work in close cooperation with Coalition 2000. This is the way to enhance
the space for public debate and to demonstrate the common will of the NGO
sector to deal with anti-corruption issues through their specific instruments.
DEYAN ASHKOV,
Chairman, Bulgarian Youth League ÒStefan StambolovÓ
REGIONAL ANTI-CORRUPTION MUNICIPAL
COUNCIL — SMOLIAN REGION
The Regional Municipal Council for Struggle Against Corruption Ñ Smolian
Region (1), hereinafter called RMC, is a voluntary public forum without a juris-
tic status. It was set up on 19.05.1999 as part of the anti-corruption project of the
Stefan Stambolov Bulgarian Youth League, developed within the framework of the
Coalition 2000 process. The Council is open in nature and serves as a place for
dialogue between representatives of state and municipal institutions, non-gov-
ernmental organizations, business, the media and citizens. It unites their anti-
corruption initiatives and helps to implement them under full transparency.
1. RMC Composition
1.1. The following state institutions are represented in the RMC: Regional
Administration, District ProsecutorÕs Office, District Court, Regional Directorate
of Internal Affairs, the Regional Customs Directorate and Tax Offenses
Prevention Service with the Ministry of Finance, State Financial Control, etc.
1.2. The municipal institutions are represented as follows: Smolian Municipality is
represented by the deputy mayor and secretary of the municipality, as well as
heads of departments in the municipality. Representatives of other municipali-
ties also take part: the mayor of the village of Momchilovtsi, as well as repre-
sentatives of Roudozem Municipality, Dospat Municipality, Devin Municipality,
Borino Municipality, Chepelare Municipality, Madan Municipality, Zlatograd
Municipality, Nedelino Municipality and Banite Municipality.
1.3. The main trade unions are also represented in the RMC by their chairmen.
They include the Podkrepa Confederation of Labor, the Confederation of
Independent Trade Unions of Bulgaria, the Promyana National Trade Union and
the District Medical Board of the Bulgarian Medical Association.
1.4. Non-governmental organizations: A number of organizations in the third sec-
tor are taking part in RMC, based either in the town of Smolian or in smaller
municipalities within Smolian region. (2)
1.5. Media: The anti-corruption campaign is assisted by the editors-in-chief of
the papers Otzvouk, Rodopski Vesti and Rodopski Pregled, Foton-K cable TV net-
work, Radio Rodopa and the correspondents of Bulgarian National Radio, the
Bulgarian News Agency BTA, Standart News daily and Maritsa daily.
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1.6. Businessmen: The executive directors of the Bulgarian Industrial Association
and Bulgarian Chamber of Commerce and Industry.
1.7. Freelance jurists and public figures
2. RMC Structure
The Regional Municipal Council for Struggle Against Corruption has a three-tier
structure.
2.1. Regional Public Forum:
Composition: By definition it includes all RMC members. At the same it has
an open composition.
Meetings: At least once every three months, convened by the chairman.
Tasks: Determines the long-term program and action guidelines of RMC,
adopts an action plan against corruption, analyzes and assesses the
state of corruption in the region, submits proposals for changes to
the legislative and statutory framework to the relevant institutions
and bodies, elects a Coordination Council from among its mem-
bers.
2.2. Coordination Council
Composition: seven persons
Chairman: Peter Malamov, Mayor of Momchilovtsi village
Deputy Chairman: Deyan Ashkov, Chairman of the Stefan Stambolov Bulgarian
Youth League
Secretary: Siyka Zabileva, spokesperson of the Regional Directorate of Internal
Affairs
Members: Georgi Kroumov, District Prosecutor, Bisser Goranov, Secretary of
Smolian Municipality, Vassil Vassilev Ñ lawyer.
Meetings: Holds meetings at least once a month, convened by the Chairman.
Tasks: Implements the decisions of the Regional Public Forum, coordinates and
manages the activities in the Action Plan against Corruption, maintains contacts
with other regional anti-corruption councils and Coalition 2000, as well as inter-
national contacts, prepares the agenda and organizes the staging of the Regional
Public Forum, reviews the signals of citizens and takes the necessary actions in
cooperation with the respective institutions and bodies.
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The activity of the Coordination Council is guided by the idea of consensus and
cooperation between the state and private sector, the trade unions, media and
NGOs as a key prerequisite for the success of the struggle against corruption.
3. Secretariat
The functions of the Secretariat of the Regional Municipal Council for Struggle
Against Corruption are performed by the Stefan Stambolov Bulgarian Youth
League. They include operational activities on the implementation of the Action
Plan against Corruption, as well as furnishing the Coordination Council with
materials and information.
The Secretariat collects and provides information on the problems of corruption,
receives signals of corruption and duly presents them to the Coordination
Council and the respective institutions and bodies, monitors the appearance
and development of other anti-corruption initiatives at local and international
level, establishes contact with the institutions conducting them and briefs the
Coordination Council on them, organizes different meetings and visits.
4. RMC Goals and Priorities
4.1. Goals:
¥ To attain the kind of level of influence in the struggle against corruption
which would lead to a change in the value system, attitudes and behavior of
people, causing them to regard manifestations of corruption as inadmissible
and unworthy.
¥ To achieve transparency and openness in the actions of state and govern-
ment institutions and local government.
¥ To improve the economic and social environment.
4.2. Priority activities:
¥ Promoting partnership between citizens associations, business and NGOs,
on the one hand, and state and municipal institutions, on the other, in the
struggle to restrict corruption practices in the region.
¥ Collecting signals of citizens about manifestations of corruption and taking
the necessary measures jointly with the respective institutions and bodies.
¥ Local monitoring of corrupt behavior in the region.
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¥ Conducting a public awareness campaign to broaden the knowledge of citi-
zens about public services and civil rights, and when those are under pres-
sure of corruption.
¥ Preparing proposals for improving the work of the state and municipal
administration and for increasing the transparency of public services in par-
ticular.
¥ Formulating possible proposals for changes to the legislative and statutory
framework.
5. Activities carried out during the pilot stage of the project
(April — June 1999):
¥ Press conference to familiarize the local and national media with the project.
¥ Introduction of a special column on the problems of corruption in the
Rodopski Vesti daily and the local press.
¥ Interviews and broadcasts in the electronic media.
¥ Regular airing of information about RMC activities on Radio Rodopa.
¥ Opening a Free Legal Advice Office on the problems of corruption and sig-
nals of citizens. The Office offers:
¥ Reception room (Smolian Regional Administration, office 516, open daily
from 5 p.m. to 6 p.m., Monday to Friday).
¥ Hot line for signals of citizens (telephone: 0310/2-46-01, open daily from 9
a.m. to 6 p.m., Monday to Friday).
¥ Mail box for signals in writing (P.O. Box 111, Smolian Central Post Office,
daily).
The office is managed by jurist Peter Malamov, former officer in the Regional
Directorate of Internal Affairs. (3)
¥ Study on ÒTransparency and Local GovernmentÓ with the participation of
state department experts, trade-union consultants and independent experts.
6. First Results
As a result of the studies conducted by RMC, the following Ògray sectorsÓ were
defined; i.e., sectors/activities containing prerequisites for corrupt behavior:
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¥ Health care: buying apparatuses; supplying medicines, food and fuel; cur-
rent repairs; issuing free medicines; issuing sick leave and medical certifi-
cates.
¥ Education: contacts for the supply of fuel and food, auxiliary school materi-
als, school building repairs, contracts for leasing school rooms for business,
raising the marks of pupils in core subjects and entrance exams, exempting
pupils from school attendance against payment.
¥ Social welfare: persons with undeclared incomes receiving social assistance
for heating and food; contracts for the supply of food, clothing and fuel; dis-
tribution of donations from the country and abroad.
¥ Culture: tenders for current repairs; contracts for organizing festivals and cel-
ebrations; contracts signed by directors of museums, galleries, libraries,
opera houses and theaters for leasing rooms and outdoor space for com-
mercial activity; supply of books, paintings, and museum exhibits (possibili-
ty of substitution with forgeries).
¥ Investments: contracts for the design and construction of infrastructure pro-
jects, privatization of municipal property, poor control on the performance
of contracts, providing inside information of strategic importance in tenders
and auctions.
Listing these Ògray sectorsÓ is a necessary prerequisite for continued RMC activ-
ity and for focusing anti-corruption efforts and initiatives in the region on the
most susceptible teams of the state and municipal administration.
In conclusion, it may be said that only the first step has been made towards
accomplishing the goals pursued by the RMC Ñ creating the organization and
action mechanism of the circles which have publicly committed themselves to
the anti-corruption cause. The accomplishment of the goals and activities
mapped out in the Action Plan against Corruption will be a decisive test for the
viability of the RMC.
NOTES
1. Geographically, the RMC encompasses the territory and population of
Smolian region. This covers 10 municipalities: Smolian, Roudozem, Dospat,
Devin, Borino, Chepelare, Madan, Zlatograd, Nedelino and Banite.
2. These are: the Stefan Stambolov Bulgarian Youth League, the Bulgarian
Association for Fair Elections and Civil Rights, the Association of Rhodope
Municipalities, the Movement for the Protection and Development of the
Central Rhodopes, the Regional Development Agency under the PHARE
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Program, the Open Society Club, the Lady Diana Ñ World Without Tears
Foundation, the Center of Non-Profit Organizations, the Center for
Sustainable Mountain Development, the Rodopi Hoteliers and Restaurateurs
Association, the Eco-World Rodopi Association, the Unique Rhodopes
Association, the CitizensÕ Forum Association, the Rodopi 21st Century
Association, the Center for the Development of Zlatograd Municipality,
Business Center Devin, the Partnership for Local Development
Association Ñ Madan Municipality, the Union for the Protection of the
Rhodopes Ñ Chepelare Municipality, the Care and Charity Association Ñ
Smolian.
3. The activity of these specialized teams warrants the conclusion that signals of
corruption are prevalent in the sphere of health care, the bodies of the Traffic
Police and the Hygiene and Epidemiology Inspectorate, the municipal and
state administration, and provide evidence of illegal appointments, lay-offs
and dismissals. Unfortunately, people are reluctant to reveal their identity
and to present facts and evidence of cases of corruption.
APPENDIX
LIST OF ACTIVITIES ON
SMALL GRANT PROJECTS
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Number Activity Objective Media effect Products
1 Sociological survey in
the town of Haskovo
The survey has been
conducted with the
assistance of the Regional
Agency for Social and
Economic Development in
Haskovo. Two groups of
people have been
interviewed Ð
representatives of the
general public and owners
or managers of small and
medium size firms.
Analytical report
2 Anti-corruption round
table discussion Ð
Haskovo, June 23
Participation on the part of
30 people from the
regional and municipal
administration, NGOs,
businessmen, journalists.
Reports in local
newspapers and
electronic media
(Haskovo), and on the
national radio
ÒHorizontÓ channel
3 Public Anti-corruption
Forum - June 30
Participation by
representatives of the
municipal and regional
administration, the mass
media, the regional
hospital and the Vratza
Customs Office, the local
court of justice, firms,
NGOs
Publications in the
local press, reports on
the central radio and
television
Foundation For Entrepreneurship Development
Number Activity Objective Media effect Products
1 Round table discussion
entitled ÒThe StudentsÕ Town
- A Corruption-Free AreaÓ
Discussion on corruption-related
problems in the StudentsÕ Town
attended by representatives of
the local administration, NGOs
and youth organizations.
Reports aired by the
national radio
ÒHorizontÓ channel and
by private radio stations
in Sofia /ÓDarik,Ó ÒAlma
MaterÓ/
TV reports aired by
ÒChannel 3Ó TV and
ÒNova TelevisionÓ
Publications in
Democratsia,Monitor,
Noshten Trud, 24 Chassa,
and Sega dailies
2 Anti-corruption concert in the
StudentsÕ Town (April 27)
The concert was organized under
the motto ÒThe StudentsÕ Town -
A Corruption-Free AreaÓ and
attracted prominent youth bands.
More than 7,000 students
attended.
Reports aired by the
national radio
ÒHorizontÓ channel and
by private radio stations
in Sofia /ÓDarik,Ó ÒAlma
MaterÓ/
TV reports aired by
ÒChannel 3Ó TV and
ÒNova TelevisionÓ
Publications in
Democratsia,Monitor,
Noshten Trud, 24 Chassa,
and Sega dailies
3 Publication of a brochure The purpose of the brochure has
been to inform students about
their right to obtain an
accommodation in the StudentsÕ
Town
Distribution of the
brochure
Students’ Association "Anti-Corruption Society" — Sofia
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Number Activity Objective Media effect Products
1 Seminars with representatives of
local authorities in Pleven and
Lyaskovets
Presentation of the project and
cooperation proposals
Publications in the
national and local
press
2 Workshop in Lyaskovets entitled
ÒTransparency in the Work of
Local AuthoritiesÓ - legislation,
existing practices, and problems
(April 23)
The discussion has focused on
the work of local authorities
and on the possibilities for
exercising civic control. The
meeting has been attended by
the mayor, the deputy mayor,
representatives of local
authorities and NGOs,
journalists.
3 Public discussion in Lyaskovets
entitled ÒCivil Society Against
CorruptionÓ (May 12)
The number of participants has
been expanded to include
local authorities, NGOs, trade-
unions, jurists, journalists, and
public activists.
Covered by
ÒEurocomÓ TV and by
Radio ÒSprintÓ Ð
Pleven
4 Joint press-conference in Pleven
with the Regional Association ÒFor
the Revival of Civil SocietyÓ (May
12)
Publications in the
local press
5 Conference in Lyaskovets
ÒTransparency in the Work of
Municipal AdministrationÓ (June
29)
Presentation of the
ÒAdministrative Services
HandbookÓ
ÒAdministrative Services
Handbook,Ó designed
for the citizens of
Lyaskovets municipality.
A similar handbook has
been drafted for the
municipality of Pleven.
1000 copies of the two
publications have been
printed.
6 Completion of the local
government ÒTransparency
MatrixÓ
Inserting the collected
data in the integrated
matrix.
7 Formation of mediation groups
and other organizational and
technical activities (end of April)
A total of 93 individuals from
Lyaskovets and Pleven have
used the services provided by
the mediation groups
8 Public meeting with the citizens of
Merdania village in the
municipality of Lyaskovets
Approximately 40 people
have requested legal advice
on administrative problems
and services.
9 Drafting a brochure ÒHow to
Oppose Corruption - Practical
AdviceÓ and providing information
about Internet sites on corruption-
related problems
Drafting and publishing
a brochure.
Association Of Young Lawyers
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Number Activity Objective Media effect Products
1 Conducting media
monitoring
Completion of forms designed to
evaluate the local media
coverage of the issue of
corruption
Producing a report on the
media monitoring
2 Telephone survey (May
3)
101 people interviewed about
corruption in Bulgarian society
Analysis of the survey results
3 Press-conference
announcing the start of
the anti-corruption
project
Presenting the project to the
media
Media coverage of the
press-conference
4 ÒClean FutureÓ essay
competition
6 essays submitted Report on the results of the
competition
5 Announcing the opening
of a telephone hotline
Citizens of the city have been
invited to provide information
about cases of corruption
Advertising the
telephone hotline on the
local ÒOberonÓ radio
No phone calls received
/possible reason: it is an office
telephone number/
6 Round table discussion
ÒProcedures for
Enhancing Transparency
and Countering
Corruption in Local
GovernmentÓ
29 managers and representatives
of local and regional authorities,
public activists, and journalists
took part in the round table.
Publications in
local/regional
newspapers.
A sharply negative
opinion about the
usefulness of this
campaign has been
registered on the part of
the editor-in-chief of the
local private newspaper
Ekip
Report on the results from the
round table
7 Public Forum ÒClean
FutureÓ discussing the
role of the media and
civil society in the fight
against corruption (June
30, 1999)
The discussion has been attended
by representatives of non-
governmental organizations, the
media, local authorities, and
young people.
The Anti-corruption
Public Forum has
enjoyed large media
coverage
Report on the work of the
forum
8 Organizing a happening
under the title ÒUnited
Against CorruptionÓ (June
30, 1999)
Several pop bands from Razgrad
have played at the concert
The happening has
received excellent
media coverage
9 Participation of the
chairperson of the anti-
corruption coalition in a
meeting hosted by the
Regional Council to
Combat Crime
An analysis of the corruption
situation in the region has been
made
10 Collecting information for
the local government
ÒTransparency MatrixÓ
Determining the principles for
distributing financial resources
among the various administrative
units
Incorporation of the data in
the integrated matrix
11 Anti-corruption
information day (June 30,
1999)
Publications in the local
press and reports in the
electronic media
Civic Coalition "Civic Council" — Razgrad
78 Local Anti-Corruption Initiatives
Number Activity Objective Media effect Products/
Results
1 Collecting information for the
local government
ÒTransparency MatrixÓ
Location of the Ògray areasÓ
and the sectors containing
potential incentives for corrupt
practices
Reports in local newspapers
and magazines (Rodopski vesti,
Otzvuk, AROmagazine)
Reports on radio ÒRodopa,Ó
radio ÒSmolian,Ó cable
television ÒFoton-KÓ
Inserting the data
into the local
government
ÒTransparency
MatrixÓ
2 Establishing an anti-corruption
telephone hotline, post office
box, and a reception room for
free-of-charge consultations on
corruption-related problems
15 people visited the reception
room. Over 208 calls
expressing support for the
project objectives were
received on the telephone
hotline. 11 signals of corrupt
practices were also received
on the phone. Another 34
testimonies of corrupt practices
arrived by mail.
Reports in Rodopski vesti
newspaperand
on radio ÒSmolianÓ
3 Anti-corruption information
day: press-conference (April
19)
Establishing a Regional Anti-
corruption Public Council
Reports in the local and
national press and electronic
media (Rodopski vesti, Otzvuk,
Rodopski pregled, ARO
magazine, radio ÒSmolian,Ó
radio ÒRodopa,Ó cable
television ÒFoton-K,Ó Bulgarian
Telegraph Agency, Bulgarian
National Radio, 24 Chassa
daily)
4 Round table discussion (April
19)
Discussion on the corruption
situation in the town of Smolian
and on the possibilities for
reducing corrupt practices at
the local level
Reports in the local press and
electronic media (Rodopski
vesti, Otzvuk, Rodopski pregled,
AROmagazine, radio
ÒSmolian,Ó radio ÒRodopa,Ó
cable television ÒFoton-KÓ
5 Joint session of the Regional
Anti-Corruption Public Council
and representatives of the
local authorities, journalists,
and experts (May 19)
The Regional Anti-corruption
Public Council has been
officially constructed
Reports in the local and
national press and electronic
media (Rodopski vesti,
Otzvouk, Rodopski pregled,
AROmagazine, radio
ÒSmolian,Ó radio ÒRodopa,Ó
cable television ÒFoton-K,Ó
Bulgarian Telegraph Agency,
Bulgarian National Radio,24
Chassa daily)
6 Civil action ÒCitizens and
Administrative ServicesÓ (June
14)
Monitoring the quality of
administrative services
provided by the administration
in the town of Smolian (10
volunteers)
Reports on radio ÒSmolian,Ó
radio ÒRodopa,Ó and cable
television ÒFoton-KÓ
7 Meeting of the Regional Anti-
corruption Council to discuss
transparency in local
administration (June 14)
The meeting has been attended
by representatives of the
regional and municipal
administration
Recommendations
for improving
transparency in
local
administration
8 Organization of a workshop on
the rights of citizens (June 28)
The workshop has been
designed to acquaint citizens
with their rights, with the duties
of the administration, and with
the way services are provided
at municipal and regional level
9 Monitoring of the local press
coverage on the issue of
corruption
1. Analysis of the
results from the
monitoring
2. Choosing the
Winner of the
ÒSay No to
BriberyÓ
Award - the
journalist
Zarko Marinov,
Editor-in-Chief
ofOtzvouk
newspaper
Bulgarian Youth League "Stefan Stambolov" — Smolian
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1 Anti-corruption
workshop (April 13,
1999)
1. Presenting the objectives of the
Anti-corruption Action Plan
2. Forming a work group for civil
monitoring of the Shoumen
municipality
Report in
Shumenska Zaria
daily
Report on radio
ÒForteÓ
and on TV -
Shoumen
2 Seminars in the
municipalities of
Kaspichan and Novi
Pazar (May 27-28, 1999)
3 Round table discussion
(May 13, 1999)
Discussion on the local government
ÒTransparency MatrixÓ
Extensive media
coverage
Proposals:
· cutting down the 1999
budget of the United
Hospital Complex
· demanding from ÒMunicipal
MarketplacesÓ company to
provide a financial report
· asking local administration to
clean up the town of
Shoumen more often
4 Meeting with public
activists (June 2, 1999)
Discussion of the anti-corruption
campaign with the editors-in-chief
and the directors of regional media,
with the trade-union and NGO
leaders
5 Constituting a Regional
Anti-corruption Public
Council (June 25, 1999)
Discussing the results from anti-
corruption activities so far.
Determining the agenda of the Public
Anti-Corruption Forum
Numerous reports
in the regional
media
6 Public Anti-corruption
forum with the
participation of the
Vice-President Todor
Kavaldzhiev (June 29,
1999)
Discussion of the need for civil control
over public administration and for
coordination of the anti-corruption
efforts of government authorities and
civil society organizations
Publications in the
regional press
Proposals:
· organizing an anti-corruption
awareness campaign among
the students at the University
of Shoumen
· hiring workers from the
gypsy minority for the
construction of public utilities
in gypsy neighborhoods
· establishing an anti-
corruption post-office box in
the office building of the
regional governor
· drafting a declaration to the
Bulgarian President
7 Collecting data for the
local government
ÒTransparency MatrixÓ
Media reports on
the local
government
ÒTransparency
MatrixÓ
Inserting the collected data in
the integrated matrix
Center For The Study Of Political Processes — Shoumen
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1 Local Government
ÒTransparency MatrixÓ
2 Telephone hotline The hotline is open and
maintained by ÒJurists in
Support for Civil Rights,Ó
a partner organization to
ÒNSO LecturersÓ
Weak interest, probably
due to the inadequate
promotion of the
initiative
3 Two surveys among
citizens (200 people
interviewed)
Conducted by the
partner organization
ÒMENSA Ð PlovdivÓ
among two types of
respondents Ð
customers receiving
local public services
and clients of health-
care institutions
Summary and analysis
of the two surveys
4 Creation of a ÒClean
FutureÓ Internet page
Developed with the
cooperation of Infoserve
- Plovdiv
5 Public meeting
ÒTransparency of Local
Government and
CitizensÕ TrustÓ - May 14
Attended by
representatives of
NGOs, businessmen,
municipal councilors,
journalists, etc.
Articles inMaritsa daily,
24 Chassa daily, Standart
- Plovdiv, Trud - Plovdiv.
Reports on radio
ÒDarik.Ó
6 Public meeting ÒPublic
Services and CitizensÕ
TrustÓ
Attended by the deputy
mayor of the
municipality of Plovdiv,
by representatives of
local non-governmental
organizations, the
media, etc.
Articles inMaritsa daily,
24 Chassa daily, Standart
- Plovdiv, Trud - Plovdiv.
Reports on radio
ÒDarik.Ó
7 Discussion ÒCitizens and
Municipal ServicesÓ -
June 6
Over 150 people
participated in the
discussion
Numerous materials
dedicated to the
discussion have been
published in Plovdiv
newspapers.
Reports about the
discussion have been
broadcast by TV-Plovdiv
and by local radio
stations.
8 Public meeting ÒLocal
Government and
CitizensÕ TrustÓ - June 17
Articles inMaritsa daily,
24 Chassa daily, Standart
- Plovdiv, Trud Ð Plovdiv.
Reports on Radio
ÒDarik.Ó
9 Civil Council for the
protection of citizensÕ
rights before local
government - July 13
The council consists of
ten people - eight
representatives of NGOs
and two independent
experts.
Despite the media
coverage, ÒNSO
LecturersÓ registered
weak public interest in
the initiative.
"NSO Lecturers" — Plovdiv
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1 Press-conference (April 22) Presenting the project before the
mayor of Pleven municipality, the
deputy mayors, and all
departmental managers at
municipality administration
Reports on the cable
televisions ÒPleven
SprintÓ and
ÒEurokom,Ó and also
On radio ÒHorizontÓ
2 Second press-conference Announcing the establishment of a
telephone hotline
Reports on the cable
televisions ÒPleven
SprintÓ and
ÒEurokom,Ó
and on radio
ÒHorizontÓ
3 Round table discussion
ÒLegal Barriers to
CorruptionÓ
The discussion has been attended
by representatives of municipal
administration, NGOs, and civic
activists. It has been decided that
the media will be provided with
testimonies of corrupt practices
and that a pressure will be
exercised on local administration
to announce anti-corruption
measures.
Reports on radio
ÒPlusÓ and radio
ÒExpress.Ó
Reports on the cable
television channels
ÒEvrokomÓ and
ÒPleven Sprint.Ó
4 Collecting data for the local
government ÒTransparency
MatrixÓ
5 Publishing information
bulletins for April and May
The bulletins contain information
on the various municipal
departments and the services that
they perform.
Distribution of the two
bulletins among citizens.
6 Three round table
discussions (May 4, 12, 20)
on the following topics:
ÒHow to Taking an Active
Civic Stance in the Fight
Against Corruption,Ó ÒIs
Public Administration
Interested in Solving
CitizensÕ Problems?Ó and
ÒThe Ombudsman
Institution - Advocate of
CitizensÕ Essential RightsÓ
The round table discussions have
been attended by experts and
have fulfilled information and
awareness purposes.
Reports on the cable
television channels
ÒPleven SprintÓ and
ÒEurokom,Ó and also
on radio ÒPlus.Ó
Articles in local
newspapers (Posrednik,
Posoki, Pleven za
Pleven, Plevenski Vesti)
7 Survey among citizens The objective has been to
determine the quality of the
services provided by municipal
administration, and the citizensÕ
attitude to corruption.
8 Telephone survey Same purpose as above. Analysis of the survey
results
Regional Association "For The Revival Of Civil Society" — Pleven
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1 Public discussion - April 20
2 Press-conference - May 11 Presentation of the project.
Announcement of an anti-
corruption poster and
cartoon competition and
promotion of a telephone
hotline
Radio ÒVratzaÓ
3 Official opening of the
ÒClean FutureÓ exhibition,
containing anti-corruption
posters, childrenÕs drawings,
and cartoons.
Over 100 works displayed
for a period of one month
4 Publishing informational
bulletin entitled ÒClean
FutureÓ - May 25 and June 9
The bulletin describes the
main objectives of the anti-
corruption project.
5 Discussion of the Convention
for the Right to Information,
citizensÕ participation in the
decision-making process,
and access to justice in cases
of conflicts on environment
protection issues.
Reducing corruption linked
to environment protection
issues.
Publications in
the local press
(Konkurentdaily
and Chance
daily).
6 Establishing Public
Consultative Council on
Environmental and Health-
Care Issues
Discussing the option to
introduce a local
ombudsman in the field of
environmental protection
7 Filing a lawsuit against the
municipality for breaking the
Environmental Act in
determining the location of a
local Shell service station.
Publications on
the case in the
local press
Analysis presented at the International
Conference in Varna
8 Proposals for legislative
reforms
- Introduction of penalties for public
officials breaking the law;
- Changing Article 23 of the
Environmental Act which currently
allows for financial support to be
provided to the so-called
independent experts by investors
(potential polluters)
- Reports containing evaluation of the
effects on the environment of new
projects to be drafted by
organizations independent from the
state, on the model of the United
States;
- Abolishment of the term Òsilent
refusalÓ applied in cases in which
the municipality is allowed to
refuse the right to property
restitution;
- Adoption of a new act requiring
discussions and consultations with
representatives of the public before
a decision on environmental or
health-care issues is taken by the
administration;
- Establishment of the ombudsman
institution at local level. The local
ombudsman should be elected by
citizens but financed by the
municipal budget.
InfoEcoClub — Vratza
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1 Anti-corruption
information day (May
4)
Announcing the start of the project Reports on the national
radio ÒHorizontÓ
channel, on radio,
ÒGlarusÓ and radio
ÒMayaÓ (local radio
stations).
Three articles
published in local
newspapers.
2 Introductory round
table discussion
Distribution of a questionnaire
among jurists intended to provide a
definition of corruption
- A proposition to expand the
legal notion of corruption. It is
advisable that the term
corruption includes not only
common cases of bribery but
also all those acts of violation of
the law when the exchange of
material possessions and other
valuables is not directly time
related. Put simply, all cases of
exchange of services in a later
moment of time, which have
been directly related to
preceding actions, should be
criminalized.
3 Survey among
customers of the
municipal
administration
Evaluating the quality of public
services provided by the
municipality
Sociological analysis and a
legal assessment.
4 Accompanying
interviews
1. Analysis by a public servant
working in the Bourgas
municipal administration
2. Analysis by a professor of
administrative law
3. Analysis by a journalist covering
the work of local government
5 Collecting data for the
local government
ÒTransparency
MatrixÓ
Finding the mechanism for making
spending decisions
Inserting the collected data in
the integrated local government
ÒTransparency MatrixÓ
6 Survey among
foreigners (tourists and
international
businessmen in the
town of Bourgas)
Measuring the foreign citizensÕ
susceptibility to corruption pressure
and what they find as Òdangerous
areasÓ
A press-conference
and subsequent
publications in the
local media
Analysis of the corruption
pressure on international
businessmen and other foreign
citizens
7 Public discussion (July
6, 1999)
Discussion on corruption-related
problems with representatives of the
Customs Service, the health-care
services, the ProsecutorÕs Office and
the Investigation Office, the police,
the state administration, municipal
councilors and experts
8 Training seminar Training businessmen (members of
the Bulgarian Trade and Industrial
Chamber Ð Bourgas) how to apply
preventive anti-corruption measures
in the economic sphere
9 Publishing an
information leaflet
The informational leaflet instructs
citizens how to react to corruption
pressure
Distributing the information
leaflets
Black Sea Law Community — Bourgas
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1 Seminar ÒSay No to CorruptionÓ -
April 28
Attended by teachers and
students from the Vocational
School of Electrical Engineering
2 Round table discussion
ÒCorruption Could be DefeatedÓ -
May 13
Attended by representatives of
the Ministry of Interior, NGOs,
high school and university
students
3 Debate entitled ÒCorruption
Could be DefeatedÓ - May 27
Attended by students from ÒVassil
AprilovÓ high school and by
students from the Vocational
School of Electrical Engineering
4 Anti-corruption debate with the
participation of students - May 5
5 Seminar ÒCauses of Corruption
and Ways to Fight itÓ
Attended by students and
teachers from ÒAngel KantchevÓ
high school
6 Debate entitled ÒCauses of
Corruption and Ways to Fight itÓ -
May 28
Attended by students from the
high school of economics Ð
Rousse
7 Wrap-up meeting ÒThe Role of
StudentsÕ Council in the Fight
Against CorruptionÓ
Attended by students from the
City StudentsÕ Council and by
representatives of the studentsÕ
councils in 8 schools
8 Designing an anti-corruption logo
and poster, and publishing a
newspaper
Youth Center For Open Education "Seksaginta" — Rousse
Number Activity Objective Media effect Products
1 Two seminars on the following
topics: ÒMorality and CorruptionÓ
and ÒCorruption as a Sin.Ó
The seminars were attended by
teachers of humanities,
students, the mayors, and other
representatives of the
administration at ÒTriaditsaÓ
and ÒIlindenÓ municipalities in
Sofia
Reports from the
seminars have been
broadcast by the
special religious
program of the
national radio
ÒHristo BotevÓ
channel. Articles
about the event
have been
published in 24
Chassa daily,
Standart daily,
Democratsiadaily,
AzBukiweekly.
2 Survey among the participants Its purpose has been to present
a picture of the participantsÕ
moral and religious views on
corruption
3 Preparation of a brochure It will include the lectures by
renowned theologians heard at
the seminar.
Movement For Christian Revival
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1 Press conference in Pleven Ð April
4
Announcing the start of the anti-
corruption project developed
by the Bulgarian Association for
Fair Elections and Civil Rights
(BAFECR) within the framework
of Coalition 2000
Reports on radio
Pleven, and on
other local
electronic media
2 Press conference in Sofia Ð April
14
Announcing the start of the anti-
corruption project developed
by the Bulgarian Association for
Fair Elections and Civil Rights
(BAFECR) within the framework
of Coalition 2000
Reports on the
national radio
ÒHorizontÓ channel
and on private
radio stations.
Publications in
national daily
newspapers
(Democratsia, Trud,
24 Chassa,Monitor
andDuma)
3 Press conference in Veliko
Tarnovo Ð April 21
Presenting the anti-corruption
project developed by the
Bulgarian Association for Fair
Elections and Civil Rights
(BAFECR) within the framework
of Coalition 2000
Reports in local
newspapers, local
radio stations, and
local cable TV
stations (ÒVideosat
95Ó and
ÒEurocomÓ)
4 Anti-corruption forum in Pleven Ð
May 18
Attended by municipal
councilors, representatives of
political parties, of NGOs, and
of local business associations.
Proposals for legislative
changes, and for ways to
strengthen civil control over the
work of local authorities have
been discussed.
Reports on radio
Pleven and on other
local radio stations
5 Press conferences in the towns of
Blagoevgrad, Varna, Kardzhali,
Plovdiv and Yambol.
Discussing corruption problems
in the municipalities of
Blagoevgrad, Varna, Kardzhali,
Plovdiv and Yambol
Publications in local
newspapers and
reports on local
electronic media
6 Anti-corruption round table in
Veliko Tarnovo Ð May 21
Attended by the regional
governor, the mayor of Veliko
Tarnovo, and representatives of
local associations. Antonii
Galabov presented the BAFECR
activities within the framework
of its anti-corruption project.
Publications in local
newspapers
(ÒBorbaÓ, ÒNoviniÓ)
and reports on the
local electronic
media
7 Final press conference Ð June 22 Assessing the project results Publications in
national dailies
Final report ÒAnti-
corruption Public ForumsÓ
Bulgarian Association For Fair Elections And Civil Rights
